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A recent report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) on inspector 
general (IG) attrition found growing rates of IG vacancies within federal Offices of Inspectors 
General (OIGs) (Johnson, 2018). This study identified the growing rates of Acting IGs (AIGs) 
and their role as interim IGs negatively affect their offices, decreasing productivity, and 
increasing difficulty in meeting quality inspection and oversight standards. This dissertation 
identified and analyzed rates of IG employment duration and attrition in federal and state offices 
of inspectors general (OIG) between 2001 and 2017, starting with a comprehensive review on IG 
literature and their responsibilities. A discussion of empirical attrition models, theories, and 
outlier case studies followed the literature review to explain the IG attrition problem in detail. 
The dissertation’s methodology begins with identifying federal and state IGs separated by their 
temporary/permanent status, hire/departure dates, and length of service. Chi-Square, Student’s T-
test, and Correlation tests examined the statistical relationships between identified causal factors 
and IG attrition. This dissertation’s methodology also analyzed federal and state OIG statutes to 
identify their weaknesses, followed by policy recommendations to reduce IG attrition for 
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In March 2018, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published the report 
Inspectors General Information on Vacancies and IG Community Views on Their Impact (GAO 
18-270) and analyzed the growing problem with vacancies within OIGs. “As of September 30, 
2017, 12 of the 64 active offices of inspector general (OIG) established by the Inspector General 
Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), had IG vacancies” (Johnson, 2018). This raised problems 
with management and independence, as 36% of OIG employees believed Acting Inspectors 
General (AIGs) instead of permanent Inspectors General (IGs) had a negative impact on 
employee morale (Johnson, 2018). Additionally, AIGs also appeared less independent, especially 
when they showed interest in ascending to the IG position. Using data gathered from the Council 
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and www.congress.gov, the GAO 
report 18-270 identified differences between IG vacancies, AIGs, and differences in leadership. 
This report’s analysis argued the importance of keeping current IGs and reducing IG attrition, 
which would decrease AIGs serving as substitutes for IG positions. 
2 
 
Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, along with its 2008 and 2016 amendments, 64 OIGs 
were established (along with 64 IGs) as of 2018. The major legislative adjustments to the IG Act 
of 1978 are the IG Reform Act of 2008 and the IG Empowerment Act of 2016. The United States 
President appoints half of these IGs while the federal agency head appoints the second half, with 
the appointment decision depending on the size of the agency. Designated federal entity IGs 
(DFE) are customarily smaller agencies established by commissions, board, authorities, 
endowments, foundations, institutions, and other administrations identified by the IG Act (Davis, 
2014). Agency heads appoint DFEs to smaller agencies such as commissions, foundations, and 
government entities. The federal IGs do not serve terms in office (with the exception of U.S. 
Postal Service OIG and U.S. Capitol Police OIG) and usually stay in the position even when 
presidential terms change (Rosenberg, 2017).  
 
As of September 30, 2017, there were many IG vacancies within the federal OIGs. For example, 
the Department of the Interior had an IG vacancy since 1/1/2012 (six years) and the Department 
of Defense had an IG vacancy since 1/10/2016 (two years). When IGs quit, the Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 requires the First Assistant or Deputy Inspector General to 
become the AIG for the OIG. According to GAO 18-270 report’s findings, AIGs appeared to 
have a negative impact on employee morale and carrying out strategic plans to improve the OIG. 
An OIG employee stated, “An acting IG is a caretaker, someone internal who is expected to 
maintain the status quo. Therefore, having an acting IG in place for an extended period may have 
delayed the implementation of reforms or bold changes that would normally be expected from 




AIG positions have negative impacts on employee morale and leadership while also become less 
independent. In the GAO report 18-270, GAO surveyed 52 permanent IGs on their opinion on 
Deputy IGs’ independence and found that AIGs are less independent in comparison to permanent 
IGs, especially when applying for IG positions.  
 
According to a permanent IG, “Generally speaking, the position of Inspector General would be a 
desirable promotion for an acting IG (sometimes the Deputy IG). An acting/Deputy IG, 
interested in the IG position and striving to impress the agency leadership/White House for 
consideration of the IG job, could be less aggressive (independent) in an effort to please the 
‘hiring official’ (agency head/White House)” (Johnson, 2018, p. 29). This change in the AIG’s 
behavior to please their hiring official may affect them while they carry out their job 
responsibilities. Permanent IGs are less likely to please their hiring official and can be as 
aggressive as they need to carry out their job duties. Other permanent IGs disagreed and stated 
that background, character, and experience drives independence and not a permanent title. 49 out 
of the 52 IGs agreed to answer this question. 30 IGs believed that AIGs are less independent 
while 13 believed that they are independent. The remaining six IGs responded to this survey 
question with “No basis for Judgment.” In sum, AIGs are not viable substitutes for IG positions. 
There must be a new IG to fill vacant IG positions and OIGs should take measures to improve IG 
attrition.  
 
Federal AIGs serving for extended periods is not only a problem at the federal level but also on 
the state jurisdictional level. Although no readily available research or reports emphasize the 
damages or problem of state IG attrition, the concerns are similar. “Ensuring a competent, well-
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trained, and motivated workforce remains a critical challenge across government. This challenge 
continues to intensify as employees in key positions increasingly become eligible to retire, are 
lost through attrition, or migrate to other business opportunities” (CIGIE, 2007).  
 
The aforementioned research on AIGs are about federal AIGs and not state AIGs. As of early 
2018, research on state IG attrition remains quiet and this absence of research does not mean it is 
not a problem. A possible explanation for why there is no research on state IG attrition is because 
the idea of IG attrition is new and only recent. Research on this subject at the federal level has 
started in early 2018. State IG reports rarely recognize or identify IG attrition as a problem and 
extensive internet searches on this subject matter reveal no result. In short, this dissertation 
project will expand current research on federal IG attrition while also exploring IG attrition and 
duration in the state jurisdiction. In future research outside the borders of this dissertation will 
analyze county and city IG attrition to determine similar attrition factors between federal, state, 
county, and city IGs; for examples, OIG funding and subpoena powers. New research on federal 
and state IG attrition will update this dissertation beyond its completion and publication. 
 
This dissertation project will answer the following research questions to solve the IG attrition 
problem at the federal and state levels in the United States. 
 
1. What are the measures of employment duration and attrition of inspectors general, as 
measured by standard metrics of employee retention and position turnover? 
2. What legislative, functional and structural attributes of inspector general offices, and the 
agencies they oversee, are associated with different rates of employment duration and attrition? 
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3. Are there policy measures that might improve inspector general employment duration, attrition 























































This literature review consists of three major parts – IGs, attrition, and conceptual explanations 
for IG attrition. The first part explains the IG concept, the IG Act of 1978, the 2008 and 2016 
amendments to the IG Act, OIG organizational structure, responsibilities of IGs, and OIG 
performance outcomes. The second part explains attrition, the costs of attrition, and attrition 
measurement models. The third part discusses empirical theories and case studies that would 
explain IG attrition. The end of this literature review will combine the three parts and explain the 
IG attrition problem. The completed literature review will fully explain the methods to measure 
IG attrition in Chapter 3 – Methodology. This dissertation topic is different from other IG related 
topics because it moves beyond only measuring OIG structure and appointment processes and 
uses them to explain IG employment duration and attrition. Before analyzing IG attrition, the 




The Inspector General concept started as early as 1668, designated by King Louis XIV to inspect 
the conditions of his army. In 1777, the Second Continental Congress appointed Thomas 
Conway, the first IG in the Continental Army to ensure appropriate dollar spending for military 
rations and ammunitions. In 1778, Friedrich William von Steuben replaced Conway due to his 
constant disputes with his Commander-in-Chief, George Washington. Since Steuben’s 
appointment, he has been the “Father of the Inspector General system” and the IG concept has 
remained the same. Between 1778 until now, the IG concept remained focused on efficient 
federal spending, and to date has expanded its responsibilities over to combating fraud, waste, 
and abuse. OIGs are not required by statute to combat corruption but have a special focus on 
corruption depending on their jurisdiction. 
 
IG focus on corruption varies by jurisdiction but usually perceived as a local concern. “Fighting 
corruption in America tends to be seen as a local concern, with the important exception of the 
prosecutors and federal agenda under the U.S. Department of Justice (CAPI, 2016). Depending 
on the jurisdiction, OIGs turn corruption cases over to special offices designed specifically for 
corruption cases. For example, Texas and New Jersey have anti-corruption state police units 
while Maryland has a state prosecutor office designed for combating corruption (CAPI, 2016). 
There were also state OIGs that were specifically created to combat corruption; for example, the 
Massachusetts OIG in 1981 was created in response to corruption in public construction 
contracts. In short, each state has their own method to handle corruption cases that often requires 




Until the U.S. President appointed the first federal agency IG in 1962 for the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Administrative OIG, the IG concept remained quiet and informal. In 1976, the U.S. 
President appointed the first federal IG at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) (Nowolinski, 2001). The first HEW IG, Thomas Morris was responsible for auditing, 
investigating, and supervising agency programs and submitted annual reports to Congress. The 
HEW OIG led to the creation of many other OIGs and to the creation of the Inspector General 
Act of 1978.  
 
The Inspector General Act of 1978 appoints and requires federal IGs to conduct and manage 
audits and investigations, to serve as an agency leader and to recommend best practices to 
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in combating fraud, waste, and abuse. 
Additionally, all federal IGs must report to congress of all activities and challenges throughout 
their service. According to this Act, IGs are also responsible for monitoring and assuring the 
highest levels of accountability throughout their service. As better defined by the current 
Department of Defense AIG Glenn Fine, “The primary mission of IGs is to detect and deter 
waste, fraud, and abuse, and to promote economy, efficiency, and integrity within their agencies. 
IGs pursue this mission by conducting audits, evaluations, investigations, and special reviews 
relating to agency personnel and programs” (Fine, 2016). In sum, simply accomplishing these 
objectives only satisfies the bare minimum as an IG. 
 
The President appoints federal IGs with advice and consent of the Senate based only on the 
appointee’s demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, law, management, and investigations. 
The President can also remove IGs from office with written explanation for reasons doing so.  
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Assisting the IG in carrying out their job responsibilities, they must appoint an Assistant IG for 
Auditing, and Assistant IG for Investigations to supervise audits and investigations of the OIG. 
Each year, with the Assistant IG for Auditing and Assistant IG for Investigations, the IG, by 
April 30 and October 31 every year, must submit semiannual reports that detail every activity by 
the OIG between the six-month periods. In addition to submitting semiannual reports, IG must 
also submit a budget estimate to the President to specify the required funds to continue OIG 
operations. The budget estimates as submitted to Congress by the President for every federal IG 
(Inspector General Act of 1978). Similarly, agency head IG appointments started since the IG 
Act amendment of 1988, which also requires the DFEs to share the same responsibilities as IGs 
appointed by the president (Davis, 2014). This chapter will further discuss the roles and 
responsibilities of DFE IGs. 
 
In 2008, the Inspector General Reform Act improved the 1978 Inspector General Act by 
including eligibility requirements for future IGs such as meeting accounting, auditing, and 
investigation skill requirements. The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 also requires the 
President or agency chiefs to explain the removal of a federal IG, increasing the pay rate of all 
IGs, and notably, the establishment of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency (CIGIE). In 2016, The Inspector General Empowerment Act amended the 1978 Act 
by strengthening IG independence, allowing IGs to perform investigations without approval from 
agency heads, streamlining CIGIE investigation processes, greater transparency, and access to 
documents for audits and investigations. “For appointed watchdogs, independence is essential to 
assure that watchdogs are willing to exercise their audit and investigative resources without fear 
of retribution or retaliation” (Feldman, 2013 p. 257).  
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“The IG Act also provides specific protections to IG independence, including a prohibition on 
the ability of the agency head to prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any audit or investigation” (Kepplinger, 2009). The amended IG Act also provides 
IGs with a “safety net” when removed from office. IGs removed from office would remain a 
member of the Senior Executive Service and paid at least 20% more than the $100,000 annual 
salary for a GS-15 (Feldman, 2017). Feldman references an IG characterizing this protection as 
placing all the removed IGs into the “go-to-hell” club because IGs pressured into resigning may 
still respond knowing that they will maintain a salary to support their families (2017).  
 
As the IG profession grew, 1978 IG Act responded with amendments as well as some of its 
initial responsibilities. Instead of only combating fraud, waste, and abuse, IGs eventually became 
responsible for combating corruption as well since the 1970s. “One of the few recourses in place 
to investigate and expose corruption at federal agencies is inspectors general—independent, 
nonpartisan watchdogs who play a major role in uncovering and preventing abuse, fraud, and 
taxpayer waste” (Levin, 2018). To date, no official legislation requires IGs to combat corruption, 
although IGs can and already do so as a part of their profession. For example, IGs have unique 
access to government systems and files with the ability to request information if not readily 
available. IGs also have special knowledge on the government unit they are monitoring, which 
will allow them to detect corruption easier than other entities. Lastly, their presence alone makes 
it easier to receive corruption complaints. In short, although not clearly stated in OIGs’ 
organizational structure, IGs are responsible for combating corruption in addition to fraud, waste, 




OIGs’ organizational structures vary between federal, state, county, and local jurisdictions. OIGs 
establishment methods also vary across jurisdictions but follow similar guidelines as 
recommended by the Association of Inspectors General (ASIG). The ASIG is a non-profit 
membership organization for agencies and professionals in the inspector general/inspection and 
oversight community. The ASIG’s mission is to promote “excellence in the inspector general 
community by establishing and encouraging adherence to quality standards, sponsoring 
professional development and networking opportunities, certifying individuals in IG-specific 
disciplines, supporting offices in governmental and external relations, and inspiring 
governmental entities to embrace the inspector general model as an effective tool in the fight to 
combat waste, fraud and abuse” (ASIG, n.d.). Since its establishment on October 26, 1996, it has 
created an inspector general community with more than 2,000 members working in an audit, 
investigation, or oversight profession. The ASIG also created the ASIG’s Principles and 
Standards for Offices of Inspectors General (Green Book), which illustrates the highest quality 
standards required to meet OIG mission, goals, and objectives. As recommended by the ASIG’s 
Green Book, OIGs are established as a legal entity by statute or executive order. The statute 
details the OIG’s mandate, powers, authority, staff qualifications, OIG independence, and 
whistleblower protection.  
 
There are multiple ways to meet OIG missions, such as conducting audits, investigations, and 
evaluations to identify and prevent criminal behavior and misconduct. Other approaches include 
fraud control programs or operational surveys. Regardless of the types of methods used to meet 
OIG missions, IGs must be independent, free from personal and external impairments, as it may 
cause biases that would affect the objectivity of their performance.  
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OIGs should also develop a strategy that considers and analyzes the OIG’s jurisdiction, which 
plays a critical role in budget, roles, risks, staff, and vulnerabilities. Since OIGs operate under 
minimal resources, they must strategize their approaches on combating fraud, meeting the needs 
and interests of the OIG, and analyzing OIG review outcomes. In respective to fraud, OIGs 
should also strategize to prevent fraud, by implementing more staff training programs, review of 
OIG reports for trends and review on initial designs of new programs. 
 
In addition to developing strategic plans, setting goals and objectives, IGs are responsible for 
organizing the OIG to ensure efficient use of resources. The Association’s Principles and 
Standards for Offices of Inspectors General states “The OIG organizational structure should 
foster coordinated, balanced, and integrated accomplishment of the OIG mission, goals, and 
objectives” (ASIG, 2014). IGs can focus the OIG’s mission onto different areas such as fraud 
prevention, investigations, risk assessments, internal controls, etc. IGs should also control OIG 
operations to appropriately supervise all activities, ensure quality control, and periodically assess 
accomplishments supported by a strategic plan. In sum, all actions taken should help meet the 
OIG goals and objectives.  
 
Depending on the governmental jurisdiction, different parties appoint IGs. According to the 
Association of Inspectors General’s Model Legislation for the establishment of Offices of 
Inspector General, “The Inspector General shall be appointed by (the governor with the advice 
and consent of the senate), (the governor), (the legislature), (or a high ranking government 
official with a position equal to or higher than an agency head)” (2002). IGs should be appointed 
based on integrity, their skills in accounting, auditing, criminal justice, investigations, or other 
13 
 
relevant fields of study. Appointed IGs should also earn the designation Certified Inspector 
General® shortly after their appointment as IG. IGs serve five-year terms and their appointing 
authority can remove them with explanation.  
 
As outlined in the Inspector General Act, there are two main appointment types for federal IGs 
(out of five) – presidential appointed IGs and approved by the Senate (PAS) and designated 
federal IGs (DFE). The other three federal appointment types are 1) appointment by the president 
with Senate consent and enacted under a separate authority, 2) appointment by the president 
alone or with Senate consent and under a separate authority, and 3) appointment by agency head, 
enacted under separate authority and is in the legislative branch. Regardless of appointment type, 
federal IG appointments, procedure, structure, and terms are all different (Ginsberg, 2016).  
 
There are notable differences between PAS and DFE IGs, some of which include the following: 
appointment type, budget, legal counsel, and selection process. The biggest difference is the 
appointment, termination, or transfer approval. The president appoints PAS IGs with approval 
from the Senate while agency heads appoint DFE IGs. The PAS IG appointment process is 
perceived as a two-step process while the DFE appointment process is a multi-member board 
process (Kempf, 2018). “Agencies headed by multi-member boards are considered more 
independent and less vulnerable to regulatory capture because their members should, in theory, 
provide diverse points of view” (Kempf, 2018). Another difference is the source of budget. 
Budgets for DFE OIGs come from the agency’s budget process while PAS OIGs’ budget comes 
from a separate appropriations account within the budget request to Congress. Lastly, some of 
the PAS OIGs have law enforcement authority. 
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The IG Act authorized 24 of the PAS OIGs to have law enforcement authority. Since 2014, 39 
OIGS have law enforcement authority with eight of the 39 as DFE OIGs. Law enforcement 
authority includes the following as outlined by the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Offices of 
Inspectors General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority (CIGIE, 2014). 
1) Carry a firearm while engaged in official duties. 
2) Make an arrest without a warrant for any federal offense in presence of an agent or when 
the agent has probable cause to believe the person to be arrested is committing a federal 
felony. 
3) Seek and execute federal warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence 
under the authority of the United States. 
According to the Attorney General guidelines for law enforcement authorities, the Inspector 
General, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, and special agents assigned under the 
Inspector General qualify for law enforcement authority. Failure to comply with the Attorney 
General guidelines would cause the IG and their office to lose law enforcement authority. Law 
enforcement authority requires the eligible OIG staff to complete the Basic Criminal Investigator 
Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (OAG, 2003). The OIG will 
also provide additional training courses to ensure their staff is current on their physical combat 
abilities and understanding to use deadly force. The Attorney General also authorizes the OIG 
staff to carry a firearm, make arrests while under official duties, and seek and execute warrants 
under probable cause. OIG staff can also carry their firearms outside of official duty for safety 
reasons as authorized by the Inspector General. The methodology chapter in this dissertation will 




DFE and PAS IGs can also have their own attorney when political pressures become too 
difficult. The IG counsel represents the OIG and IG in personnel and compliance matters, 
provides legal advice and support in audits and investigations, and can appear in court on behalf 
of the OIG and its staff. DFE IGs can obtain legal counsel from an attorney appointed by the IG 
while PAS IGs must receive legal advice from an attorney under civil service laws. DFE IGs can 
also obtain legal counsel from an attorney that appointed by and reporting to another IG or an 
attorney that is on the CIGIE (Burrows, 2009). Employee selection processes are different 
between PAS and DFE IGs, with DFE OIGs usually having smaller offices. There is also the 
perception that PAS IG positions are more attractive or unattractive to candidates because the 
president would appointment them instead of an agency head. “The PAS process ensures that 
potential appointees are subject to more extensive ethical and political scrutiny, and IGs 
appointed under the PAS process may have greater credibility than their agency head appointed 
counterparts” (Burrows, 2009).  Lastly, PAS OIGs appear more productive than DFE OIGs 
(Kempf, 2018).  
 
Not all DFEs have OIGs. In 2014, Congress had a budget threshold of $100 million to determine 
which DFE should have IGs (Davis, 2014). Under Davis’ study, there were concerns on creating 
small OIGs within DFEs with limited resources and unqualified staff. Regardless of resources, 
Congress makes final decision to appoint IGs to DFEs. Davis recommended as a remedy for 
DFEs without IGs that “on a case-by-case basis, that specific small agencies could benefit by 
obtaining IG oversight from another agency’s IG office where the missions of the two agencies 
are somewhat similar” (2014). This case-by-case basis is already in practice. For examples, the 
Department of State oversees the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Agency for 
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International Development has oversight over the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the U.S. 
African Development Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation, and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (Davis, 2014). In short, an alternative to provide oversight to DFEs 
without appointment IGs due to budget constraints is to give a similar DFE IG the oversight 
authority on a case-by-case basis. The policy recommendation chapter in this dissertation will 
further discuss DFE appointment processes. 
 
To decrease the differences between PAS and DFE IGs, Burrows recommended converting DFE 
IGs to PAS IGs. “There are several approaches that Congress could pursue—(1) taking no 
action; (2) converting some DFE IGs into PAS positions; (3) converting all DFE IGs into PAS 
positions; or (4) converting some or all DFE IGs into PAS positions but including a sunset 
provision” (2009). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2002 report explained how the 
conversion of DFE IGs to PAS IGs would be a smart move because it would improve 
independence, efficiency, and effectiveness of the offices. Regardless of a conversion or not, the 
differences between PAS and DFE IGs might be significant enough to explain IG vacancy rates. 
 
Converting DFE IGs to PAS IGs is not an original concept. Congress has already attempted to 
convert DFE IGs to PAS IGs because it may conceptually increase independence. As defined by 
the Government Auditing Standards,  
“In all matters relating to the audit work, the audit organization and the individual 
auditor, whether government or public, must be free from personal, external, and 
organizational impairments to independence, and must avoid the appearance of such 
impairments to independence. Auditors and audit organizations must maintain 
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independence so that their opinions, findings, conclusions, judgments, and 
recommendations will be impartial and be viewed as impartial by objective third parties 
with knowledge of the relevant information.” 
 
Similarly, Kepplinger defines independence as the ability to remain objective and maintain an 
independent attitude during an audit as well as recognized by others that the auditor is 
independent. The independent attitude is also known as intellectual honesty (2009). Kepplinger 
believes “that the differences in the appointment and removal processes between presidentially 
appointed IGs and those appointed by their agency heads result in a clear difference in the level 
of independence of the IGs” (2009). At one point in time, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation had weak independence and as a result, Congress converted this DFE OIG into PAS 
OIG. Another agency that Congress also converted from DFE to PAS was the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. In short, Congress understands the importance and benefits of converting DFE to PAS 
OIGs to increase IG independence. 
 
Independence is difficult to maintain because of external pressures or presidential influences on 
the IGs. According to Kempf, presidents can signal their expressions on OIG operations and 
depending on the president’s philosophy and pressure, they impose pressure on an OIG, causing 
the IG to less likely conduct audits and investigations (2018). Regardless of the IG Act providing 
independence protection, any weakness in independence will eventually reduce efficiency of the 
office. Kempf’s research also found that depending on the presidential administration, there 
appears to be a decrease in audits and investigations. For example, the OIGs sampled in Kempf’s 
research shows that they were less productive during the Obama administration in comparison to 
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the Bush administration. Additionally, “IG turnover is related to increased productivity with 
regard to audits but decreased productivity with regard to investigations” (2018). Regardless of 
the jurisdiction IGs are responsible for, they must all maintain independence, as well as many of 
the aforementioned factors. The sections below describe the differences between state and local 
IGs.  
 
There are subtle but notable differences between state and local IGs. Typically appointed by 
governors with legislative consent, State IGs focus on employee misconducts, ethics violations, 
and contract misappropriations (Feldman, 2013) According to Daniel Feldman and David 
Eichenthal, the role of the state IGs is to serve as a lie detector for individuals that lie on their 
resumes, job applications, and contract award dollars. This oversimplified responsibility comes 
with its challenges, such as practical, legal, political, and cultural factors that can all limit the 
oversight abilities and powers of the IG (Feldman, 2017). ”As of 2011, more than half of all 
states have an OIG. 11 of these states are not statewide OIGs but are rather OIGs for Medicaid or 
Health and Human Resources; for example, the Texas Health and Human Resources OIG. 
Although they are not statewide OIGs, they are also well resourced and have a unique 
partnership between state and federal government” (Feldman, 2013). In sum, state IGs share 
similar the responsibilities and follow the same standards and challenges as federal IGs by sitting 
on a two-legged stool and reporting to two masters while remaining independent.  
 
The responsibilities of local IGs are similar to state IGs, where they report to two masters as 
well. According to Salkin on local OIGs, “The office of inspector general is typically created 
with two different but related purposes aimed at the common goal of restoring faith in local 
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government-to detect and reduce both waste and wrongdoing. To reduce waste, inspectors 
general are given the mandate to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the operations of 
government entities, as well as the programs they administer” (2012). In 1995, the City of 
Yonkers OIG was established and their first IG Philip Zisman reported to the mayor and City 
Council. The initial purpose of this OIG was to focus on economy, efficiency, effectiveness in 
government while also having broad investigatory powers for investigations. However, Yonkers 
did not need another law enforcement unit to combat corruption and instead needed audits. “In 
many instances, departmental procedures were antiquated and inefficient, and operations had 
never been subject to an external review or evaluation. Thus, there was little objective 
information on how effective the city government was in delivering municipal services” 
(Zisman, 2004). The Yonkers OIG focused on performance reviews of government operations 
and monitoring procurement/municipal contract processes but unfortunately still received 
criticism. The local Yonkers newspaper reported that their OIG was not serving as a strong 
public watchdog but instead more of a management consultant due to not following the 
traditional IG approach of handling employee misconduct and conflicts of interest (Zisman, 
2004). This balance between focusing on government efficiency and as a fierce watchdog is a 
challenge for all OIGs, with some offices having fewer resources to accomplish the same goals 
and objectives. 
 
One of the major differences and challenges at local level OIGs is resources. The level of 
resources per municipal OIG depends on their duties, responsibilities, and size of government. 
Municipal OIG budgets vary across jurisdictions as well as their budget processes. For example, 
the City of New Orleans OIG is required to submit an annual operating budget with proposed 
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expenses while the Montgomery County OIG submits a projected budget to the executive and 
council for four-year terms. In 2010, the City of Chicago OIG’s budget estimated to $2,170,842, 
the City of Yonkers OIG’s budget estimated to $432,487, and Montgomery County OIG’s 
budget estimated to $617,717,163 (Salkin, 2012). In short, there is often a big gap between 
current level vs demand for resources, impeding on output of the IG. (Feldman, 2013). Although 
this is one of the bigger challenges of local IGs, “all watchdogs face the problem of limited 
resources and watchdogs who work for the government must often battle against each other 
“essential” public functions in the budgeting process.” (Feldman, 2013). In short, local IGs 
perform at the highest standards possible similarly to state IGs, given the minimum resources 
available. This dissertation will focus on federal and state IGs to establish the status of IG 
attrition, leading to a special interest in studying local IGs in future research. 
 
Regardless of the OIGs’ jurisdiction, IGs share the same responsibilities, starting with ensuring 
accountability. IGs are also responsible for ensuring accountability, which “is not commonly 
associated with invention or novelty or serendipity, but rather with carrying out assignments, 
which are more or less specifically defined, honestly, efficiently, effectively, and at minimal 
cost” (Light, 1993, p. 13). Under the 1978 IG Act, it combines the three forms of accountability: 
Compliance, Performance, and Capacity-based accountability.  
 
Compliance based accountability focuses on employees following rules and regulations. 
Performance accountability focuses on improving organization outcomes by rewarding 
employees for merit work. Capacity-based accountability focuses on organizational 
effectiveness, through training programs, technological improvements, and stewardship. These 
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definitions are short and not exhaustive and requires an independent-minded professional, who 
understands the service is about doing what’s “right” as opposed to fulfilling personal interests. 
Accountability is challenging to monitor and enforce, and to prioritize one form of accountability 
over another is another balancing act for IGs. According to Daniel Feldman, “Sometimes there is 
pressure on IGs to stress compliance monitoring at the expense of performance monitoring and 
capacity-building, and related pressure to stress the investigator side of the office at the expense 
of the auditor side” (Feldman, 2013, p.114). Other IGs would prioritize performance 
accountability because audits on agency efficiency and outcomes often determine the root causes 
in problems with resource management and waste. Regardless of IG accountability preferences, 
all three forms of accountability affect overall IG leadership. 
 
The inspection and oversight profession requires IGs to be an ethical leader or “a role model who 
is credible, trustworthy, and exhibits moral behavior” (Wang, 2015). These role models are also 
known as authentic leaders. Avolio, Walumbwa, and Weber’s definition of Authentic Leadership 
is “as a sequence of transparent and ethical leader behavior that encourages openness in sharing 
information needed to make decisions while accepting input from those who follow” (Olaniyan, 
2016). Authentic leadership is similar to Chinese leadership theory and according to Dan 
Feldman, the “the three most important factors building binding political leadership to supporters 
are guanxi (familial, local, linguistic or other such ties forming the basis for mutually supportive 
behaviors), loyalty, and competence” (Feldman, 2017). Guanxi is more than caring for your 
colleagues, its one step above having concern for others but rather having a deep understanding 
of how others think, their morals and values, and making decisions that unify everyone’s 
interests – all of which requires strong morality and character.  
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Leadership plays a critical role in the success of failure of an IG. An important characteristic of 
an efficient leader is independence. Because of the IG’s unique dual-reporting responsibility to 
their agency head and to congress, their job is also known as “straddling a barbed-wire fence” 
which requires them to complete their mission objectively and independently. “IGs and the 
CIGIE have various reporting requirements to Congress, the attorney general, agency heads, and 
the public that provide invaluable insights into agency actions and inactions. IGs must report 
suspected violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to the attorney general” 
(Rosenberg, 2017). When federal IGs report their findings to their agency head, the agency head 
must send the report to Congress in 30 days unaltered but they can also include their comments 
to the IG’s findings. IGs, regardless if federal or state, can only report their findings to the 
agency head and not to any of their subordinates. As quoted by Glenn Fine, “IGs must be 
independent. You will do things that I won’t like. You will do things other members of Congress 
won’t like. You will do things the Attorney General won’t like. You won’t be liked. Nobody will 
like you. Don’t try to be liked, because it won’t happen” (Fine, 2016).  
 
IGs are disliked for their dual reporting responsibility, especially since their reports focuses on 
reporting fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA). FWA falls under the umbrella of white-collar crimes. 
“White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust, which lowers social morale and 
produces social disorganization on a large scale” (Sutherland, 1940, p.15). Fraud is using 
deception for personal gain, a crime that requires specialized knowledge and premeditation. 
“Fraud often is hard to detect, particularly when either contracts are so complex or records are so 
disorganized that an IG investigator or auditor cannot understand the operating scheme or cull 
enough evidence to convince a U.S. attorney to convene a grand jury to compel testimony” 
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(Light, 1994). Waste is poor/misuse use of organization resources. Abuse is overstepping 
political power boundaries based on status, rank, or position for personal gain. Corruption is 
public service hypocrisy, when elected officials prioritize personal interests that also contradict 
public interests, which are the same reasons for their appointment. One of the biggest challenges 
of combating FWA is determining current rates and damages of FWA, all of which can leave a 
strong or poor impression of IG leadership.  
 
White-collar crimes are difficult to detect and measure. Even if practitioners agreed on an 
instrument to measure FWA, the data collection process would present a new challenge, as many 
forms of FWA remain unreported. Out of the categories of white-collar crimes, corruption is the 
most difficult to measure and combat. According to Frank Anechiarico and James Jacobs, 
research does not attempt to calculate or estimate corruption because 1) they are rarely reported 
to authorities, 2) there are no statistics on corrupt acts committed by public officials, and 3) the 
definition of corruption has changed significantly over time, which up until this point even 
includes official and private conduct (1996, p.xiv). Additionally, corruption is challenging to 
detect. “The difficulties in detecting corruption, coupled with the term’s changing definition, 
make it unwise to speculate as to whether there is more official corruption today than there was 
in the past or whether there is more corruption in one city or county than in another. Simply 
discovering more corruption in a particular city at a particular time does not mean that corruption 
is on the rise; it may indicate only an increased effort to ferret out corruption in that place and at 




While combating FWA, IGs encounter the “low hanging fruit” and “big fish” dilemma. IGs who 
focus on minor complaints will show activity and small victories but will portray having “an 
obsession with small issues that allow the big boys to line their pockets. Such perceptions may 
also obscure the real extent of an IG’s independence by creating a false impression that 
corruption controls do not apply at the highest levels” (Johnston, 2010). Low hanging fruit can 
sometimes lead to the big fish. Low hanging fruit are also faster and easier to uncover in 
comparison to their big fish counterparts, which may take months of evaluation that may still end 
up as low hanging fruit. Focusing on low hanging fruit impedes the success of an IG, and “for 
external or more independent watchdogs, success depends on their ability to apply the 
disinfectant of sunlight to the problems identified and to use a combination of political and 
communication strategies to achieve reform” (Feldman, 2013, p.35). Success of an IG depends 
on their ability to combat FWA and to ensure accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. “The 
ultimate success or failure of an IG office is largely determined by the individual IG placed in 
that office and that person’s ability to maintain independence both in fact and appearance” 
(Davis, 2014). This raises the question if IGs are successful in meeting their objectives. 
 
Since the early 2000s, IGs were under constant evaluation on their performance to determine if 
they were successful in meeting their objectives or if they were worth having around. In 2009, 
federal IGs established by the IG Act reported $43.3 billion dollars in potential savings from 
their audits and investigations (GAO, 2011). In this 2009 GAO fiscal year report, the reported 
return on investment (ROI) was $18 for every IG dollar spent. For the longest time, IG 
performance success was measured through ROIs. According to John Hudak and Grace Wallack, 
they asserted that the most quantifiable metric of IG performance is ROI (2015). “This basic 
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performance, used widely throughout private enterprise to assess the profitability or viability of 
firms, business divisions, or individual actors, is widely ignored by government, particularly 
congressional budget officials” (Hudak, 2015). Although ROI can measure IG performance, it is 
not the best measurement because it focuses on program outputs (dollar value of disallowed 
costs) and not program outcomes. Additionally, IGs are often reviewed on program compliance 
with quality standards and not on program outcomes (2019). It is the greater emphasis on 
program outcomes that improves IG performance and effectiveness, not the dollar values saved 
(Francis, 2019). In short, although the most basic measurement (ROIs) for performance is 
applied to the work of IGs, it inefficient because it does not measure program outcomes.  
 
IG performance is not only difficult to measure but also difficult to determine. Since the creation 
of the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, it required IGs for the executive branch to report their 
most serious and biggest performance challenges for the year and is referred as the Top 
Management and Performance Challenges (TMPC). IGs must submit TMPV reports to their 
agency head 30 days in advance to their submission of their Annual Finance Report or 
Performance and Accountability Report (Francis, 2019). According to the CIGIE, a review of 61 
federal IG TMPC reports found the most severe challenges to IG performance below (2018). 
1) Information Technology Security and Management 
2) Performance Management and Accountability 
3) Human Capital Management 
4) Financial Management 
5) Procurement Management 
6) Facilities Maintenance 
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7) Grant Management 
The Information Technology Security and Management challenge encountered difficulties 
protecting the federal information technology (IT) systems from cyber-attacks and replacing old 
IT equipment with new systems to improve operation effectiveness. “Outdated or obsolete IT 
systems can potentially reduce system reliability and affect an agency’s ability to fulfill its 
mission” (CIGIE, 2018). Failures to upgrade IT equipment will eventually lead to damage to 
national security. The Performance Management and Accountability challenge identified how 
OIGs have not used performance data in important decision-making, and their agencies lack 
reliable program data and metrics to ensure appropriate resource spending. The lack of 
performance data negatively affects OIG programs. For example, the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) following programs encountered difficulties combating crime because of their 
inability to collect performance data. 
1. Federal Bureau of Prison’s Healthcare and Rehabilitation services 
2. Drug Enforcement Administration 
3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives  
In short, important decision-making processes for operations and effectiveness does not use 
performance data, causing difficulties in meeting organization objectives. Future research outside 
of this dissertation will focus on challenges gathering OIG performance data. 
 
Human Capital Management challenges faced by federal OIGs include but are not limited to 
funding and staffing to carry out OIG missions. Keeping highly skilled staff with backgrounds in 
cyber security is the biggest challenge for OIGs. Additionally, an OIG’s culture affects how 
employees will behave, with some problems including ethical lapses, lack of accountability, lack 
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of fiscal responsibility, lack of transparency and communication, resistance to change, and low 
morale (CIGIE, 2018). Financial Management challenges include poor financial reporting 
systems and improper payments. Procurement Management challenges include poor oversight 
over procurement planning, contractor performance, and training of personnel. Lastly, the 
Facilities Management and Grant Management focused on staff working conditions, 
deterioration of infrastructure, and poor oversight over grant funds. According to the CIGIE, 
“many of the challenges were negatively impacted by resource issues, both human and 
budgetary, and federal agencies’ failure to use performance-based metrics to assess the success 
of their programs and operations” (2018). In short, because federal OIGs do not measure 
performance or use performance data important decision-making, it caused the aforementioned 
TMPC, resulting in reduced OIG effectiveness.  
 
To address the problem of OIG effectiveness caused by lack of OIG performance data, the 
Project on Government Oversight (POGO) has recommended that IGs should have continuous 
access to their agency’s data instead of requesting “snap-shot” information for an ongoing 
investigation (Hempowicz, 2018). Continuous and live-time access to information will 
streamline IG investigations. IGs should also have more access to data analytics software, as 
most IGs do not have access to the latest data analytics software nor do they have the qualified 
staff to use the data. Without performance measurement tools, staff, and live-time access to 
information, IGs will continue to struggle with effectiveness and performance. If OIGs 
adequately measured performance, the OIGs can determine if there is loss of productivity 
especially during periods of IG vacancy. Future research should focus on OIG performance 
during periods of IG vacancy.  
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OIG performance is one of the many factors that would affect IG attrition. OIG functional and 
structural attributes can also affect IG attrition; for example, an OIG’s investigatory powers. In 
CAPI’s research survey on state oversight agencies, they categorized state oversight 
investigatory powers into the following (2016): 
1) Searches and seizures, public hearings, and subpoena 
2) Only public hearings and subpoena 
3) Only subpoena 
4) No investigative powers 
5) No watchdog 
State oversight agencies with extensive investigative powers such as searches and seizures, 
public hearings, and subpoena include Alabama, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York State, 
Ohio, and Virginia. Fifteen states only have public hearings and subpoena power while nineteen 
only have subpoena power. The remaining states do not have either investigative powers or state 
watchdogs such as North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Conceptually, state OIGs with 
weak investigative powers are probably less efficient in carrying out their responsibilities, 
leading to state IG attrition. Future research should focus on the extent of investigative powers 
that IGs have and if it affects IG attrition. 
 
Another factor that may lead to IG attrition is budget. CAPI’s oversight survey research also 
found Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Montana, and Nevada state oversight agencies’ annual budget 
costing the most out of their state expenditures (in percentages) in comparison to other states 
(2016). Other states with expensive annual budgets include Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, and 
Massachusetts. OIGs with weak budgets are less likely to perform better in their audits and 
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investigations, which may lead to weak independence and eventually IG attrition. Future 
research should focus on the amount of impact budget has on an OIG’s performance and if it 
affects IG attrition. 
 
CAPI’s research on state OIGs also ranked state OIGs based on the following seven factors of 
effectiveness (2016): 
1) Strong legal foundations 
2) Broad jurisdiction 
3) Safeguard of independence 
4) Robust enforcement powers 
5) Ample resources 
6) Partnerships with complementary institutions 
7) Political will 
CAPI’s state OIG effectiveness rank system categorized state OIGs into having a strong, 
standard, or weak IG model. New York, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Louisiana 
were ranked as having a strong IG model. Weak IG models have fewer resources, power 
limitations, and narrow mandates, which may lead to IG attrition. Each potential factor that 
hinders the work of IGs is unique across each state. For example “Looking across the country, 
it’s interesting to note that some small states, like Rhode Island and Hawaii, have relatively 
strong oversight systems, while some big states, like Arizona and Michigan, lack them. In 
general, oversight systems are more developed in more urbanized states like Florida, Illinois, and 
the Northeast, due perhaps to high-profile municipal corruption scandals and more organized 
reform movements (CAPI, 2016). Future research should focus on state OIGs with weak IG 
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models to narrow down the specific functional and structural attributes that cause IG attrition and 
other factors of IG effectiveness. In short, OIG attributes such as budget, effectiveness, or 
powers can also affect IG attrition. Before we analyze the problem of IG attrition, we will first 
discuss attrition from an academic standpoint. 
 
There are also volumes of academic research on employee attrition. According to Benton, his 
definition of attrition tells us that it is “any personnel transaction which results in the vacancy of 
a previously filled position, including those where the position is immediately refilled, and those 
which result from promotions, disciplinary actions, retirements, and voluntary resignations” 
(1988, p.17). Wayne Cascio and John Boudreau separate attrition into two categories – 
Voluntary and Involuntary. When an employee voluntarily leaves their position, it is Voluntary 
Attrition. When an employer terminates or asks an employee to, it is Involuntary Attrition. Jack 
Phillips and Adele Connell identified six applicable employee attrition factors to IGs (2003). 
1. Survival as an Issue 
2. Productivity Losses 
3. Workflow Interruption 
4. Loss of Expertise 
5. Disruption of Social and Communication Networks 
6. Job Satisfaction of remaining employees 
7. Lost Image of the Organization 
 
1) Survival as an Issue identifies the problem that very few candidates qualify for IG positions. 
Because of scarce candidates, any rate of IG attrition could potentially lead to immediate failure 
of an OIG.  
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2 and 3) Productivity Losses and Workflow Interruption identifies the problem of having a 
productivity gap when IGs suddenly quit, causing problems for current and future audit and 
investigation cases.  
4) Loss of Expertise focuses on the background experience of the IG, who often have unique 
skills to carry out their roles better than other IGs. The sudden loss of a special skill can cause 
OIG failure.  
5) Disruption of Social and Communication Networks occurs when IGs suddenly quit, causing 
disruptions in multi-jurisdictional audits and investigations due to loss of relationships.  
6) Job Satisfaction of remaining employees can decrease when not accustomed to working for 
their new IG or AIG and can decrease productivity or increase in remaining staff turnover. 
Lastly, 7) IGs are also poster children for their OIG, which plays a critical role in maintaining 
organization image.  
 
Discussing attrition only conceptually paints a simple understanding of the IG attrition problem. 
To understand the IG attrition problem, we will first discuss the costs of attrition, then identify 
standardized attrition models, and finally select the proper models to measure IG attrition.  
According to Wayne F. Cascio and John W. Boudreau, there are three major cost groups for 
attrition. The three major costs of attrition are below. 
1. Separation 
2. Replacement 
3. Training  
 
1) Separation costs are direct costs and can calculate Total Employee Attrition Cost with the 
following equation: Exit interview costs + administrative costs related to termination + 
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separation pay + unemployment tax. This does not consider indirect costs. Indirect costs can 
exceed direct costs as it calculates replacement and training costs which includes administrative 
costs, supplies, and personnel time.  
2) Some replacement costs include communication of job availability, pre-employment 
administrative functions, entrance interviews, testing, staff meetings, and more.  
3) Training costs are also very costly and depends on costs with trainers and costs with trainees.  
In addition to direct and indirect costs, there are productivity and business costs because of 
transitions between former and new employees. These costs include overtime by other staff to 
cover the vacancy, costs associated with need for additional help, costs from low employee 
morale, costs from loss of profit since departure, and more (Armstrong, 2006). In sum, direct and 
indirect costs can hurt an organization especially OIGs since they operate on low budgets.  
 
Armstrong’s turnover research also focuses on turnover measurement methods. He starts with 
the explanation of reasons for turnover, which includes the following: more pay, better prospects 
(career move), more security, more opportunity to develop skills, better working conditions, poor 
relationships with managers/leaders/colleagues, harassment, or personal (Armstrong, 2006, p. 
380). Armstrong also identifies the costs of labor turnover, which includes: leaving costs, 
recruiting replacements, cost of time, costs related to introducing replacements, training 
replacement staff, and loss of input/support from resigned staff (2006, p. 381). More notably, 
Armstrong measures turnover through the following models – crude employee attrition /labor 
turnover index, survival rate, half-life index, stability index, and length of service analysis 
(Armstrong, 2006). All of these models originated from the General Attrition Model. 
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The General Attrition Model calculates the rate of attrition by totaling the number of 
attrition/turnover incidents per period divided by the average work force size and multiplied by 
100 for a percentage. Average work size is determined within a time-period (annually or 
monthly). To calculate annual turnover, find the sum of monthly turnover over a 12-month 
period. To calculate monthly turnover, find the number of employee turnover within a month 
divided by the number of employees in the same month. The General Attrition model cannot 
measure IG attrition because there is only one IG position and would not make sense for this 
equation because it requires a large workforce size. Additionally, the General Attrition model 
calculates monthly turnover and is inapplicable to IGs. 
 
To accommodate average work force size sample challenges, Armstrong’s Crude Employee 
Attrition can measure IG attrition as well (Armstrong, 2006). The Crude Employee Attrition 
calculates attrition differently from the General Attrition Model by measuring attrition as a 
percentage between the number of resigned employees in a time-period and the average number 
of employed individuals in the same time-period, instead of the average work force size. This 
model can accommodate certain years where OIGs had either mass hiring or extreme budget 
cuts.  
 
Armstrong also created the Labor Stability Index model but it excludes employees who have 
worked in a job position for more than one year. The equation is the number of employees with 
one or more years’ service divided by the number of employees employed at the beginning of the 
year and multiplied by 100. The problem with using this model for this dissertation is that it 
excludes IGs and AIGs who have served in their positions for less than a year. This model also 
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does not include IGs appointed throughout the year. In sum, this model cannot measure IG 
attrition. 
 
Armstrong’s third model is the Survival Rate, which analyzes the number of employees at a 
particular start date and how many of them still stay with the organization after x amount of 
months or years of service. For example, if there are 10 IGs appointed in 2010 and only 7 of 
them stayed for the first two years, there is a survival rate of 70%. If only 5 of them stayed for 
the third year, the survival rate is 50%. This model traditionally calculates attrition in cohorts, 
where everyone starts at the same time. Since IGs are not all appointed in the same month or 
cohort, this model cannot measure IG attrition (Armstrong, 2006). Armstrong’s fourth model – 
Half-life index, created from the Survival Rate, determines how much time it takes before half 
the staff originally hired has resigned. Similar to the Survival Rate, the Half-life index cannot 
calculate IG attrition. 
 
Armstrong’s fifth model is the Stability Index and identifies the tendency for longer service 
employees to commit to the organization. The Stability Index’s formula is the number employees 
with a year’s service or more times 100 divided by the number of employed staff 1 year ago, 
which will compute employee continuity in an organization. This model can produce misleading 
results “because the index will not reveal the vast different situations that exist in a company or 
department with a high proportion of long serving employees, in comparison with one where the 




Armstrong’s sixth model is the Length of Service analysis, which reports attrition by employees’ 
length of service, the total number of leavers, the average number employed, and the Index of 
labor turnover. The Length of Service analysis is practically the “go-to” model for measuring 
attrition or at least present attrition rates in a clear and coherent fashion. This model will measure 
IG attrition in the methodology section.  
 
Armstrong is not the only author on attrition models. Benton’s attrition research on correctional 
officers offers a different perspective on employee attrition. For example, Benton claims that 
programs used to target and reduce attrition are often more costly than having no programs. 
“Programs to reduce attrition often cost money. Some programs include higher levels of pay, 
greater opportunities for participation in post and job assignment decisions, and other changes. 
These efforts usually do not come without cost” (Benton, 1988). Benton also claims that 
characteristics of retirement plans, promotional incentives, and training programs could all 
reduce attrition. The characteristic that really drives attrition is salary, as it must be both 
competitive and fair. “Pay must be competitive. If an employee’s skills are marketable at a 
higher rate, he or she will be under considerable pressure to change jobs. Pay must be equitable. 
If an employee believes that he or she is not receiving fair compensation in relation to others, the 
resulting dissatisfaction may ultimately lead to withdrawal from the organization” (Benton, 
1988).  
 
Benton measures attrition among three rates: 1) Instability rate, 2) Separation rate, and 3) 
Wastage rate. 1) Instability rate is the number of employees who left divided by the number of 
employees at the beginning of a time-period. Instability rate cannot calculate IG attrition as IG 
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appointment is year-round. 2) Separation rate is the number of employees who left divided by the 
average number of employees during the same time-period. This is similar to Armstrong’s Crude 
Employee Attrition Rate and cannot calculate IG attrition. Lastly, 3) Wastage rate is the number 
of employees who left divided by the number of newly hired employees during the same time-
period and can calculate IG attrition. The methodology chapter in this dissertation will use 
Wastage Rate to calculate IG attrition.  
 
For this dissertation, the models that will analyze attrition are the Crude Employee Attrition 
Model, Length of Service analysis, and Wastage Rate. The section below highlights the recent 
research findings on federal IG attrition and the lack of research on state IG attrition.  
 
Because of the extensive list of responsibilities that IGs must follow, it is worthwhile to adopt 
policies that reduce IG attrition. The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 and the Inspectors 
General Empowerment Act of 2016 are starting points for reducing IG attrition but does not 
remedy the problem. The IG attrition is new and unique, as it focuses on employment positions 
held by very few qualified individuals, or sometimes, held by no one for years. On July 9, 2018, 
the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) established a review group to improve the quality 
of the inspector general profession. POGO recommended the demand for strong leadership, 
prioritizing major issues of our nation, protecting whistleblowers, and addressed the problem of 
IG vacancies. “One of the most glaring problems that needs to be addressed is IG vacancies. 
Some IG positions remain vacant for years. Our recommendations emphasize the importance of 
the President and Congress making it a priority to fill these positions. Both must be committed to 
nominating and vetting qualified candidates who are willing and able to address the nation’s 
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major issues” (Hempowicz, 2018). POGO’s review group only focuses on federal OIGs and not 
on state OIGs. Although there is some research on federal IG attrition, this is not a popular topic 
on the state level.  
 
Research on state OIG attrition is a new topic, as recent research and reports only reflect federal 
IG attrition. With extensive research, very few state IG reports only briefly discuss attrition and 
barely representing a major concern. For example, the New Jersey OIG’s 2009 Annual Report 
briefly mentions attrition with “Since that time, OIG has reduced its annual appropriation by 
nearly one million dollars and eliminated full-time positions through attrition in order to reach 
required budget reductions, and still each year realized a surplus of funds that is provided back to 
the General Treasury funds” (2009). In short, state IG attrition is an unrecognized problem but 
still a problem nonetheless. As a result, this dissertation has identified the problem of state OIG 
attrition and explored the differences in comparison to federal IG attrition. This dissertation 
included state IG attrition as a part of its research sample as simply identifying federal IG 
attrition does not hold strong value. The analysis between federal and state OIGs will properly 
address the problem of IG attrition, leading to future research on local IG attrition. Federal and 
State IG attrition findings will first be separate analyses and then later compared with each other.  
 
Similar to other IG research projects, this dissertation used OIG structure and appointment 
processes as explanatory factors to explain and solve the problem of IG attrition. This 
dissertation analyzed IG attrition of most federal OIGs and the top three states with the most 
state OIG offices – Florida (FL), Illinois (IL), and New York (NY). FL, IL, and NY will be the 
first sample sizes for identifying and explaining state IG attrition. Conclusions from the IG 
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attrition analysis assisted in recommending policies to improve the IG profession and reduce IG 
attrition. As mentioned before, this dissertation does not analyze federal OIGs between State 
OIGs; they are two separate analyses with separate results. 
 
Empirical studies on attrition identified the effects of job insecurity, stress, role overload, and 
lack of ethical voice as factors for attrition. These factors are sample models and can 
conceptually explain IG attrition. Most of the factors Nwagbara identified fall into the turnover 
category of job insecurity. As defined by Immaculada Silla, Francisco Gracia, and Miguel Angel 
Manas, job insecurity is “powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job 
situation. “First, job insecurity is commonly accompanied by feelings of unpredictability (Sverke 
et al., 2002). In other words, people are uncertain about what their future holds, which makes it 
difficult for them to react appropriately (2010, p. 450). Job insecurity negatively affects peoples’ 
attitudes with work and the feeling of unfair treatment. When there is fair treatment among 
employees, they are less likely to feel job insecurity. Reciprocal relationships or exchangement 
of favors between employees reduces feelings of job insecurity. IGs treated unfairly with little or 
no reciprocal relationships may feel inclined to resign. 
 
Job insecurity also affects job performance, absenteeism but some scholars argue that instead of 
driving employees to quit, it may encourage them to work harder and being less absent 
(Saufenbiel, 2010, p. 101). According to Thomas Saufenbiel and Cornelius Konig, it is “the fear 
of losing one’s job may motivate employees to engage in individual action to actively cope with 
the threat” (p. 102). It is a different perspective on what pressure does to employees, and the 
thought of working harder under difficult circumstances could instead improve their self-security 
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in the work environment. Employees can also fear the sudden change in lifestyle by quitting their 
job and that fear may also deter employees from quitting. For example, employees who are 
insecure with their job, but also want to quit, may realize that the stress of quitting and having no 
alternative may be too overwhelming for them, causing them to stay at their job. In sum, job 
insecurity could lead to increased pressure, causing IGs to quit and raising IG attrition rates. 
 
Most job dissatisfaction, employee turnover, and job insecurity studies often identified stress as a 
major factor for attrition. “40% of employees believe their jobs are “very” or “extremely” 
stressful and at least 26% of employees feel “burned out” at work (Grawitch, 2007, p. 275). The 
stress that employees experience at work is either a Hindrance or Challenge Stressor. “A 
hindrance stressor can be defined as excessive or undesirable work-related demands that interfere 
with an individuals’ work achievement” (Saufenbiel, 2010, p.102). Examples of Hindrance 
Stressors are employees have different expectations and goals between each other, unsure and 
unclear with job responsibilities, having too much work and cannot meet deadlines, “busy” work 
that impedes success or productivity, and personal stressors that are unrelated to work. A 
Challenge Stressor is a form of stress that employees experience when trying to achieve or 
accomplish work-related goals for personal gain. Employees that are trying to accomplish goals 
often find themselves overwhelmed with responsibility, under time pressure, and extreme 
workload. Scholars have argued that Hindrance and Challenge Stressors are not unique to each 
other but rather different perspectives of stress. For example, office politics can be both a 
Hindrance and Challenge Stressor because engaging in politics may produce positive outcomes 
and personal gain (Saufenbiel, 2010, p. 112).  In sum, Hindrance and Challenge Stressors can 
cause IGs to quit.  
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Role Overload is the type of pressure when experiencing difficulties meeting job demands, strict 
deadlines, and having weak skill requirements for the job. Employees that experience role 
overload are unable to meet job demands given the amount of resources available. “Of all the 
criticisms I have heard about OIGs – and I believe I’ve heard most of them – lack of timeliness is 
the one that resonates with me the most, and the one that is most difficult to address. Sometimes, 
inadequate resources, or a relentless and increasing caseload, make it difficult if not impossible 
to handle all matters rapidly” (Fine, 2016). According to Jisung Park, Heesun Chae, and Hyun 
Jung Kim, “work stress resulting from role overload is the primary reason that high performers 
feel job dissatisfaction and leave their current position to work at another firm, despite the 
rewards that are offered at their current organization” (2017, p. 619). In short, role overload can 
pressure IGs to resign. 
 
“Ethical voice is an individual’s attempt to change (rather than escape) a situation in which they 
do not deem ethical in the organization (Hirschman 1970). Feeling psycho- logically safe and 
entrusting in the management level are necessary for an individual to be willing to voice their 
ethical related concerns” (Wang, 2015, p. 1281). Having an ethical voice is a key characteristic 
to being an IG, given the fact that they must report to two masters on the matters they oversee in 
an organization regardless of fear of consequences.  
 
On November 30, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security’s IG John Roth resigns due to a 
conflict in his ability to release report on the Trump administration’s travel ban. Acting 
Homeland Security’s Secretary Elaine Duke claimed that Roth’s report was intended to be 
released but with the violation of laws sections censored. Roth attempted to dispute the claims 
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that there is a connection between his retirement and the travel ban report and it remained silent 
since. Illinois Senator Tammy Duckworth spoke with Roth, and concluded, "If you're going to 
invoke a privilege and say that, 'Sorry, we can't discuss that' or 'we can't talk about that because it 
goes to the deliberative process,' then what you're doing is you're just shutting down the ability 
of the IG to do work," Duckworth said in an interview. "It would be a significant departure that 
could really degrade the ability of IGs across government to do their work, which would be 
really concerning” (Kopan, 2017). In sum, an ethical voice can take many forms, and regardless 
of the circumstances, it could lead to IG attrition. 
 
Most IG resignation cases will fall under Thomas Lee and Terence Mitchell’s Unfolding Model, 
where employees experience different thought processes before they decide to resign. “The 
unfolding model (Lee & Mitchell, 1994) is a retrospective, classificatory account of voluntary 
turnover that treats quitting as a decision process” (Morrell, 2007). This decision process has 
three main features: 1) Image Theory, 2) “shock and script” and 3) people resign in five distinct 
ways (Path 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b). Image Theory claims that any conflicts in principles, goals, and 
methods used to achieve goals, results in Image Violation, which leads to job dissatisfaction. 
Images in Image Theory and Image Violation are visions and goals that employees want to 
achieve, the values it preserves, and how they will be obtained. Weak image is what leads to the 
path decisions of the Unfolding Model. In sum, Image Theory is the systematic decision making 





Resignations fall under either the “shock” or the “script” category. The shock category is when 
employees suddenly experience an event (mostly unpleasant), prompting an employee to search 
for a new job or to quit abruptly. The script category is when employees premeditate their 
decision to quit. Some of the paths in this model often first encounter a shock, which then leads 
to a script to resignation. IG voluntary attrition will also fall under either the shock or the script 
category.  
 
The five paths are 1) The Pre-determined Script, 2) Push Factors, 3) Pull Factors, 4a) Quit Job 
Impulsively, and 4b) Job Search then Quit. Each of the four paths in the Unfolding Model leads 
to employee resignation but for different reasons. The first three paths start with a shock, leading 
to a script. The Pre-determined Script (path 1) is when an employee experiences a shock but 
already has a plan to leave. This shock can be a life-changing event and is not always a harmful 
experience or related to job dissatisfaction. Dissatisfied employees will have a plan to leave 
because they have been in a similar situation before, where they felt job insecurity, role overload, 
or any of the ideologies identified earlier and have already thought of a plan to quit, usually 
because they have done so in the past. The Push Factors (path 2) is when employees have done 
some self-reflections after the result of a shock, and realized that their current position is not 
where they want to stay. The difference between path 1 and path 2 is that employees 
experiencing path 2 do not have a plan, and leave impulsively. The Pull Factors (path 3) is when 
an employee witnesses a shock and compares their job to another job. This other job appears to 
the dissatisfied employee unexpectedly. However, path 3 disregards job satisfaction, because 
although one might be happy with their current job, if a better opportunity arises, they may 
resign for the new job position. The difference between path 2 and 3 is that employees 
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experiencing path 3 just had/found better alternatives to their current position and decided to quit 
for a new job. In the last two paths (4a and 4b), dissatisfied employees do not experience a shock 
and either quit immediately or first search for a new job then quit shortly after (Morrell, 2001).   
As with all theories, the Unfolding Model has criticisms. The Unfolding Model suffers the same 
problem as with all other turnover models as it is also weak in predicting turnover intentions and 
at sometimes impractical. There is no finite model that would explain why employees quit. A 
classic problem with the Unfolding Model is that the variables used to calculate and test this 
model changes every study, making it difficult to determine which variables actually predict 
turnover intention. Additionally, research often does not test all paths of the Unfolding Model or 
does a poor job testing each path appropriately. According to Tae Heon Lee, “future research 
needs to investigate a broader range of turnover paths to fully understand the complexities of 
turnover behaviors implied by the unfolding model” (2013). The Unfolding Model does not 
accurately capture all voluntary turnover intentions and only conceptually explains IG attrition.   
 
The aforementioned variables commonly explain IG attrition but do not cover all cases. The 
section below identifies outlier case studies that explain IG attrition outlier factors.  
 
On October 19, 2017, New Orleans IG Ed Quatrevaux retired due to health reasons, and of 
course is in search for a new candidate for his position. Quatrevaux’s Assistant Inspector General 
for Investigations Howard Schwartz and Assistant Inspector General for Government 
Performance Nadiene Van Dyke were both interested in Quatrevaux’s position. At this time, 
Schwartz was investigating Van Dyke for steering agency contracts to friends, conducting audits 
with unprofessional agendas, and terminating employees who disagreed with her decisions. 
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Schwartz said he conducted the investigation on Van Dyke because it was his job to report 
fraudulent activities, not because he wanted Quatrevaux’s job. This story spiraled out of control 
and claims were made against Schwartz that he started the investigation because he wanted 
Quatrevaux’s job and wanted to eliminate his competitor. Schwartz stated, “The idea that I did 
this because I wanted Ed Quatrevaux’s job is preposterous” (2017). 
 
Because of this investigation, Quatrevaux fired Schwartz and stated that his investigation claims 
had no credibility. The irony of it all is that “it was Quatrevaux himself who told him to 
scrutinize Van Dyke, Schwartz said. That came after an employee complained in March that Van 
Dyke had undisclosed and inappropriate relationships with contractors working for the office and 
had made other missteps” (Williams, 2017). Schwartz’s response to all this was “All I had to do 
was nothing, he said. There would be no internal investigation. Ed Quatrevaux supports me for 
this position. But I did that because it was the right thing to do. And it cost me my job” 
(Williams, 2017). Shortly after the incident, Derry Harper was appointed as IG and Schwartz 
was asked to resign on August 10, 2018. 
 
On February 3, 2012, Houston, Texas’ Inspector General Roger Dogulm resigned after working 
for 14 months. The OIG only received small complaints, such as selling tamales at a local police 
department or discrimination claims. Dogulm attempted to investigative Jolanda Jones for using 
city resources to fund her own private law practice, but once referred to the District Attorney’s 
office; there was not enough evidence to prosecute Jones. “Doguim said he is leaving, in part, on 
the principle that an inspector general should be a limited-term appointment. He said he also has 
a family matter to attend to” (Moran, 2012). Although Dogulm claimed he had a family matter to 
attend, he was dissatisfied with his job and quit two years into his appointment.  
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Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA) IG Jon Wooditch was caught masturbating on the job 
multiple times each week in the VA OIG conference room. When DOI IG agents questioned 
Wooditch, Wooditch denied all claims and said, “I do not admit to doing it. I don’t think I did 
it… I don’t remember even being in there.” Wooditch also refused to take a polygraph exam, 
claiming that he did not believe in the machine. Finally, the Daily Caller News Foundation called 
Wooditch on his home phone, in which Wooditch responded, “I don’t have any comment at all. I 
didn’t resign, I just retired. I don’t even know what you’re talking about. I’ve never heard that, 
I’ve never done that.” In short, acts of public indecency also cause IGs to resign. 
 
In short, many factors lead to IG attrition. Future research should identify and analyze the 
normative and outlier causes of IG attrition to answer the research question: Why Inspectors 
General Quit?  This dissertation provides the framework for this future research question and 

































To analyze and solve the federal and state IG attrition problem, this dissertation project used 
publically available semi-annual reports, media reports, and labor statistics to collect, analyze 
and compare 2001 – 2017 federal and state IG attrition rates. This dissertation did not analyze IG 
attrition rates from 2017 – present for the following reasons: The current presidential term will 
provide incomplete information and cause incomplete attrition analyses. Additionally, U.S. 
President Donald Trump has a strong adverse opinion of IGs and given his recent attempt to 
terminate every federal IG in 2017, including IG attrition throughout his presidential term would 
skew attrition averages. In short, this dissertation collected and analyzed IG attrition from the 
past 16 years (Bush administration 2001 – 2008 and Obama administration 2009 – 2017) and 
will analyze IG attrition under the Trump administration in future research. 
 
This unit of analysis for this project is IG employment, which includes the hire/departure dates of 
IGs. The AIGs, IGs, and Acting Inspectors General who become Inspectors General (AIGIGs) 
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hire/departure dates were measured separately. These three IG categories were measured 
separately between federal and state IGs. The selected states for this analysis are Florida, Illinois, 
and New York and were measured independently and compared with each other throughout the 
analysis. The independent variables are length of service, appointment type (federal IGs), and 
law enforcement authority (federal IGs). The dependent variable for this project is IG attrition 
and was measured using various attrition models identified in the literature review. 
 
This dissertation started with collecting two sets of attrition data – agency and individual. The 
sample sizes between federal and state IG attrition were not merged with each other and were 
separate analyses. Both sets of data categorized IGs into AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs to prevent 
overlap and double reporting. Only officially appointed IGs with public records identifying their 
appointment were included in this analysis. AIGs that served on a short interim basis with no 
public records identifying their position as AIG were not included in this analysis. Public records 
include semi-annual reports, investigation/audit reports, and media coverage.   
 
In the agency dataset, it will determine the attrition rates of AIG, IG, and AIGIG of federal, 
Florida, Illinois, and NY State OIGs. This section will identify the federal and state IG term 
duration and attrition rates between 2001 and 2017. Most federal, Florida, Illinois, and New 
York state OIGs created after 1981 and remained active as of the end of 2017 served as the 
sample size (1981 was when the first statewide OIG was created – Massachusetts OIG). 
Discontinued state OIGs were excluded in this analysis. Research findings on the state OIGs in 
this analysis were not assumed or applied to other state OIGs across the country. As mentioned 
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before, although there is no empirical research on state IG attrition, this dissertation took the first 
step towards analyzing federal and state IG attrition. 
 
The agency dataset consisted of AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017 for 68 federal OIGs 
and 47 state OIGs (Florida, Illinois, NY). This dataset determined how many AIGs, IGs, and 
AIGIGs an OIG appointed from 2001 – 2017. The rates of AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs were coded 
as ratio variables. OIGs with the least or most IGs or with longer length of service rates were 
also discussed in detail. 
 
The individual dataset identified the AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs, for each of the selected federal, 
Florida, Illinois, and NY State OIGs. The information collected for both datasets included IG 
attrition rates from 2001 – 2017. Because some IGs were appointed before 2001 and continued 
their service past 2001, they were also included in this analysis. The individual dataset also 
included the hire and departure dates as well as the IG’s length of service. Due to possible 
confusions in definitions between appointment dates, confirmation dates, hire dates, and start 
dates, the year of when these events occurred were used for analysis. The year of when the IG 
resigned from the OIG was also used to avoid confusions between resignation date, termination 
date, and official last day at the office. For example, if an OIG appoints or terminates an IG on 
November 6, 2014, only 2014 was used for analyses. 
 
After completing the data collection for the agency and individual datasets, the methodology 
section reported the following. 
1. Total Number of IGs appointed 
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2. AIG, IG, and AIGIG attrition per OIG 
3. Length of Service separated by AIG, IG, and AIGIG 
4. Length of Service separated by presidential terms 
5. Length of Service separated by PAS/DFE (federal only) 
6. Wastage Rate 
7. Crude Employee Attrition 
The IG attrition, employment duration, and calculated attrition rates reported rates starts with 
federal IGs, followed by the combined total of Florida, Illinois, and New York attrition, 
employment duration, and calculated attrition, and their rates separately per state. 
The methodology chapter also highlighted the following on IG employment duration and 
attrition from 2001 – 2017. 
1. OIGs with the highest rates of attrition 
2. IGs that served for more than one OIG. 
3. IGs with the longest employment duration 
4. AIGs who served as AIGs at the same OIG multiple time and not appointed to IG 
Throughout determining attrition, employment duration, and calculated attrition for federal and 
state IGs, the following statistical tests determined relationships between the following variables. 
1. Independent Samples T-Test between Federal OIG appointment type (DFE/PAS) and 
number of AIGs. Federal OIG appointment is a dichotomous variable and will serve as 
the independent variable. DFE is coded as 0 and PAS is coded as 1. AIGs is a ratio 
variable and will serve as the dependent variable. This statistical test will determine if 
there is a relationship between federal OIG appointment types and rates of AIGs. If there 
is a statistical relationship between the two variables, it is likely that depending on the 
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appointment type for federal OIGs, there are more AIGs due to its feasibility and 
perceived level of independence. 
2. Chi-Square between Federal IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length 
of Service. Federal IG appointment dates by presidential term codes IG appointment 
dates into one of the following categories: a) before 2001, b) 2001 – 2004, c) 2005 – 
2008, d) 2009 – 2012, and e) 2013 – 2017. Length of Service is categorized into a) less 
than 1 year, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, etc. IGs with a length of service more than 20 years 
are grouped together. IGs hired and terminated within the same year will have their 
length of service coded as “less than one year”. This statistical test will determine if there 
is a relationship between federal IG appointment dates and if at the president at the time 
of their employment affects the IG’s length of service. This test will also determine if IG 
vacancy also shares the same results with Kempf’s research on decreases in OIG 
productivity. 
3. Chi-Square between Federal IG departure dates by presidential term and their Length of 
Service. The codes for this statistical test will share the same codes as for the Federal IG 
appointment dates by presidential terms and their Length of Service statistical test. This 
test will determine if there is a general employment duration rate that IGs serve and 
resign during certain presidential administrations due to external events.  
4. Chi-Square between State IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length of 
Service. The coding structure for this statistical test will follow the same format as 
outlined for #2. This statistical test will determine if there is a relationship between a state 
IG appointment date and if at the president at the time of their employment affects the 
IG’s length of service. 
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5. Chi-Square between FL State IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length 
of Service. This statistical test is a subsection of #3. The coding structure for this 
statistical test will follow the same format as outlined for #2. The purpose of this 
statistical test is the same as #3. 
6. Chi-Square between IL State IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length 
of Service. This statistical test is a subsection of #3. The coding structure for this 
statistical test will follow the same format as outlined for #2. The purpose of this 
statistical test is the same as #3.  
7. This analysis will not include a Chi-Square test or Correlation test for New York State 
appointment dates by presidential term and length of service as the same size is too small 
for analysis. 
8. Independent Samples T-Test between Federal OIGs having Law Enforcement Authority 
(No/Yes) and rates of AIGs. Law Enforcement Authority is a dichotomous variable and 
will serve as the independent variable. “No” will be coded as 0 and “Yes” will be coded 
as 1. AIG rates will be a ratio variable. The purpose of this statistical test is to determine 
if law enforcement authority makes the profession more difficult, thus affecting the rates 
of AIGs.  
 
Although IG service terms were categorized by presidential terms, it does not exactly mean the 
president’s term completely caused the changes in attrition as it could be other external factors 
occurring within the same period. To address this concern, statistical correlation tests determined 
the strength of the statistical relationships. Presidential terms were used to categorize periods of 
attrition activity and to address differences in appointment and departure dates of IGs. IGs are 
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not appointed seasonally or in cohorts, which makes most attrition measurement instruments 
inapplicable when measuring IG attrition. Using presidential terms as a framework for IG 
appointment, departures, and attrition also guides future research in explaining the causes of IG 
attrition due to political events during presidential terms. This dissertation collected and analyzed 
federal and state IG employment duration and attrition and uses its findings to introduce topics 
for future research. 
 
After an analysis of IG attrition, a separate analysis of OIG statutes’ attributes determined if the 
weaknesses in state IG legislature that would conceptually lead to IG attrition. This analysis 
started with the Federal IG Act, followed by Florida Statute 20.055, IL Statutes 15 ILCS 305/14 
and 5 ILCS 430/20-10, and NY Executive Law Article 4-A. The statutory analysis analyzed the 
IG position qualification and vacancy requirements. This section also compared the position 
qualifications and vacancy requirements between the IG Act, Florida, Illinois, and New York to 
determine legislature weaknesses for policy recommendation. The final chapter of this 
dissertation discussed policy recommendations for existing and future federal and state IGs. 
 
The final chapter summarized the attrition and statutory analysis findings, identified current 
legislature that affects IG employment and duration, and recommended best practices to reduce 
IG attrition. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, the IG Act, and the state IG statutes 
Florida Statute 20.055, IL Statutes 15 ILCS 305/14 and 5 ILCS 430/20-10, and NY Executive 




In sum, the completed components below identified and solved the problem of federal and State 
IG attrition.  
1. A comprehensive internet search of federal and State IG semi-annual reports, media 
reports, and labor statistics to determine IG attrition from 2001 – 2017. 
2. Create two databases (agency and individual) using the gathered attrition data from #1. 
3. Using data collected from #2, identify and determine the rates of IG employment duration 
and attrition. 
4. Analyze federal, Florida, Illinois, and NY state OIG statutes to identify weaknesses that 
cause IG attrition. 
5. Identify and recommend policy amendments to existing policy to improve IG 
employment, attrition, and agency performance. 
 























Out of the 73 United States federal OIGs, this dissertation selected 70 as its sample size to 
represent the total (three OIGs were omitted from this analysis due to incomplete/unusable data). 
Out of the 70 federal OIGs, 36 are designated federal entity/agency head (DFE) appointed and 34 
are presidentially appointed (PAS). Within the selected 70 federal OIGs, 259 individuals filled 
the IG positions from 2001 – 2017 and were officially appointed as AIGs, IGs, or were AIGIGs. 
Deputy IGs that served shortly as AIG but not officially appointed were not included in this 
analysis. Several federal OIGs appointed five or more IGs while most federal OIGs appointed 
less than five from 2001 - 2017. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense OIG had eight 
IGs from 2001 – 2018 while the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had two IGs. 






Graph 1 – Number of federal IGs appointed 
 
Note: Some individuals were appointed as federal IG in multiple OIGs.  
 
The graph above shows most federal OIGs had two or three IGs from 2001 – 2017. 16 federal 
OIGs had two IGs and 18 federal OIGs had three IGs. A few federal OIGs had one or eight IGs 
from 2001 – 2017. Four federal OIGs had only one IG from 2001 – 2017. Five federal OIGs had 
seven or eight appointed IGs from 2001 – 2017 are shown in the table below.  
 
Table 1 – Federal OIGs with most appointed IGs 
Federal OIGs with most appointed IGs 
Federal OIG PAS/DFE Total IGs 
Agency for International Development PAS 8 
Department of Defense  PAS 8 
Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors  PAS 7 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation DFE 7 






















Number of Federal IGs appointed to OIGs  
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Three of the top five federal OIGs with the highest rates of appointed IGs were PAS while the 
remaining two were designated federal entity appointed DFE. There could be a relationship 
between presidentially appointed OIGs with high rates of IG attrition, which will be discussed 
later. 
 
Table 2 - Federal IGs who served in more than one federal OIG 
Some federal IGs served in more than one federal OIG from 2001 – 2017. The federal IGs that 
served for more than one year are below as well as their LOS. This list includes federal AIG/IG 
for at least one year of service. OIG 1 is the first federal OIG served followed by OIG 2, the 
second federal OIG served. 








Scott Dahl Smithsonian 
Institution 
DFE 2 years Department of 
Labor 
PAS 5 years 
Harold Damelin Small Business 
Administration 
PAS 3 years Department of 
the Treasury 
PAS 2 years 
Clark Ervin Department of State 
and Broadcasting 
Board of Governors 
PAS 2 years Department of 
Homeland 
Security 
PAS 1 year 
Glenn Fine Department of 
Justice  
 
PAS 1 year Department of 
Defense  
 
PAS 2 years 
Phyllis Fong Small Business 
Administration  
 
PAS 3 years Department of 
Agriculture  
 


















PAS 9 years Department of 
Commerce  
 
PAS 1 year 
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Gordon Heddell Department of 
Labor  
 
PAS 7 years Department of 
Defense  
 
PAS 2 years 
Carl Hoecker U.S. Capitol Police 
 




DFE 5 years 
H. David Kotz Peace Corps 
 














PAS 14 years 
Steve Linick Federal Housing 
Finance Agency  
 






















Hubert Sparks Denali Commission 
 








Housing and Urban 
Development 
 
PAS 1 year Federal Housing 
Finance Agency  
 
DFE 1 year 
Eric Thorson Small Business 
Administration  
 
PAS 2 years Department of 
the Treasury  
 
PAS 10 years 
Adam Trzeciak Federal Maritime 
Commission  
 




DFE 5 years 
David Williams Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax 
Administration 
 
PAS 3 years U.S. Postal 
Service 
 




Out of the 17 federal IGs listed above, nine of them started at a PAS OIG and continued their 
service at another PAS OIG. Four out of the 17’s first federal OIG was DFE and with their 
second federal OIG employment at a DFE. The remaining four switched from a DFE OIG to 
PAS OIG or vice versa. There is a chance that serving at a PAS/DFE OIG will likely lead to a 
preference in serving in a different OIG with the same appointment type. 
 
Most of the federal IGs in this list started serving between 1-4 years in their first federal OIG and 
in their second federal OIG, some served more than ten years, especially for the PAS OIGs. For 
example, Phyllis Fong first served as IG in Small Business Administration and when appointed 
as the Department of Agriculture’s IG, she served 16 years. Similarly, J. Russell George first 
served two years in his first federal OIG position and 14 years in his second position. All the IGs 
that served for more than ten years in their second position as federal IG were all PAS. In short, 
it appears that federal IGs will have longer employment duration in their second federal IG PAS 
IG experience after their first. Familiarity with the system, job responsibilities, and other factors 
that were more difficult to handle during the IG’s first experience could explain the employment 
duration of IGs’ second experience. 
 
The breakdown of the IGs is AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs in the following three tables, starting with 







Graph 2 – Federal AIG attrition per federal OIG 
 
From the graph above, we can see that 21 of the federal OIGs did not officially appoint an AIG 
from 2001 – 2017. The federal OIG with the most AIGs (five) from 2001 – 2017 is Agency for 
International Development. 27 of the federal OIGs only had one AIG at this time. In short, more 
than half of the federal OIGs did not have any or just one AIG. It is possible that type of IG 
appointment (DFE/PAS) causes AIG attrition and with statistical test results testing this 
assumption below. 
 
Table 3 – T-Test for Federal AIG count and appointment type 
Independent Samples T-Test for Federal AIG count and appointment type 
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Levene’s Test 
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The independent variable for this test is federal IG appointment method (DFE/PAS coded as 0/1) 
and the dependent variable was AIG count (ratio variable). The Student’s T-Test above shows us 
a Levene’s Test significance value of 0.043, which means we should interpret the Equal 
variances not assumed significance value (.000). This statistical test result shows that there is a 
statistical relationship between type of federal IG appointment and number of appointed AIGs.  
The strength of the statistical test is below using Eta Correlation. 
 
Table 4 – Correlation for Federal AIG count and appointment type 
Eta Correlation for Federal AIG count and appointment type 
      Value 
Nominal by Interval Eta Appointment (0 = DFE/ 1 = PAS) 0.55 
    AIG Count 0.487 
 
Because the dependent variable in this test is AIG Count (continuous variable), we will interpret 
the .487 value, showing a moderate level relationship. In short, the type of IG appointment 
(DFE/PAS) moderately affected the rates of AIGs from 2001 – 2017. Conceptually, PAS are less 
likely to appoint AIGs and will be discussed later.  
 
The statistical results here also share similar results to Kempf’s research, where DFE OIGs are 
less productive in comparison to PAS OIGs. It is possible that DFE OIGs are less productive 
because there were more appointed AIGs, causing difficulty in maintaining independence due to 
a conflicting incentive to please the hiring official to be appointed permanent IG. With high rates 
of AIGs, it decreases independence, staff morale and diminished aggression in audits and 
investigations. “An IG who lacks independence cannot effectively fulfill the full range of 
requirements for the office. Lacking this critical attribute, an audit organization’s work might be 
classified as studies, research, consulting, or reviews, rather than independent audits” 
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(Kepplinger, 2009). In short, there are many factors why DFE OIGs are less productive than PAS 
OIGs.  
 
Although there is a statistical relationship between federal IG appointment method and number 
of AIGs, this is not the case for IG appointment method and IGs. The federal IG attrition rates 
per federal OIG are below. 
 
Graph 3 – Federal IG Attrition per federal OIG 
 
From the graph above, 23 of the federal OIGs had one IG, 19 federal OIGs had two IGs, and 16 
federal OIGs had three IGs. In short, most federal OIGs from 2001 – 2017 had one to three 
appointed IGs (this does not count prior appointment as AIG) and it appears that most federal 
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Graph 4 – Federal AIGIG per federal OIG 
 
From the graph above on federal AIGIGs per federal OIG, more than half of the federal OIGs 
(49) did not appoint AIGIGs. Only 17 federal OIGs only had one AIGIG from 2001 – 2017. The 
federal OIG with three AIGs appointed to IGs is Federal Communications Commission. In short, 
federal AIGs were unlikely to become appointed to IG from 2001 – 2017 regardless of 
appointment method. 
 
Below are the length of service (LOS) minimum, maximum, median, and mode of AIG, IG, 
AIGIG employment duration for the 261 IGs from 2001 – 2017. 
 
Table 5 – Federal IG Length of Service Overview 
Federal IG Length of Service Overview 
IG Category LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median LOS mode 
AIG >1 year 6 years 3 years >1 year 
IG >1 year 28 years 14 years 3 years 
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From the table above, AIG, IGs, and AIGIGs at a minimum served one year from 2001 – 2017. 
The longest employment duration for AIG is six years, for IG is 28 years, and for AIGIG is 17 
years. The median LOS for AIG was three years, for IGs is 14 years, and for AIGIG is nine 
years. Lastly, most AIGs from 2001 – 2017 served for less than one year, most IGs served for 
three years, and most AIGIGs served either five or seven years. In short, federal IGs normally 
serve between 1 – 7 years depending on their status as AIG, IG, or AIGIG. 
 
Not all federal IGs serve between 1 – 7 years. Some appointed IGs served before and after our 
period of study. The federal OIGs with one appointed IG from 2001 – 2017 are the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Postal Regulatory Commission, and Railroad Retirement Board and are 
in the table below. The Postal Regulatory Commission (DFE) appointed Callender for 11 years 
while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (PAS) and Railroad Retirement Board (PAS) 
appointed Hubert Bell and Martin Dickman for over 20 years. Bell and Dickman were appointed 
prior to the scope of our analysis (Bell was appointed on July 8, 1996 and Dickman was 
appointed on October 14, 1994).  
 
Table 6 – Federal IGs with longest employment duration 
Federal IGs with longest employment duration 
Federal OIG PAS/DFE Inspector General Length of Service 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAS Hubert Bell 22 years 
Postal Regulatory Commission DFE Jack Callender 11 years 
Railroad Retirement Board PAS Martin Dickman 24 years 
 
The table below illustrates total IG appointment and departure dates categorized by AIG, IG, and 
AIGIG separated by presidential terms. 
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Table 7 – Total Federal IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Total Federal IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 




AIG appointment 2 26 20 14 23 85 15 
AIG departure 2 22 19 12 20 75   
IG appointment 38 27  32 21 28 146 25 
IG departure 3 18  27 22 27 97   
AIGIG appointment 9 6  4 8 1 28 5 
AIGIG departure 2 3  5 5 4 19   
Total IG appointments 49 59 56 43 52 259 44 
Total IG departures 7 43 51 39 51 191   
 
Before President Bush’s first term in 2001, 38 IGs were appointed and since then, the IG 
appointment rate never increased past 32. This analysis included IG appointment and departure 
rates before 2001 because their service extended into the Bush and Obama administrations. 
Excluding IG appointment and departure rates before 2001 would negatively affect the 2001 – 
2004 appointment and departure rates and were included in this analysis. The highest IG 
departure rate is in Bush’s second presidential term (27) and in Obama’s second presidential 
term (27). There is also more IG appointments and departures under the Bush Administration in 
comparison to the Obama administration. The following line graph illustrates the total IG 









Graph 5 – Total Federal IG appointments and departures by presidential terms 
 
Since Bush’s first presidential administration, the difference between total federal IG 
appointments and departures decreased until the end of Obama’s second presidential 
administration. It appears that federal IG appointments and departures may continue to share 
similar rates or possibly higher rates of IG departures in future presidential terms. The following 
statistical Chi-Square test determined a statistical relationship between federal IG appointment 
dates and IG LOS. 
 
Table 8 – Chi-Square Test for Federal appointment dates by presidential term and IG LOS 



























Total Federal IG Appointments and Departures by Presidential Terms
Total IG appointments Total IG departures
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 103.980a 20 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 114.427 20 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 259     
a. 2 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.48. 
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The variables for this test are IG appointment dates categorized by presidential term and federal 
IG LOS (both nominal variables). IGs that were appointed prior to Bush’s first presidential term 
(coded as >2001) were also included as their LOS extended into Bush’s first presidential term. 
The Pearson Chi-Square test shows statistical significance between IG appointment dates by 
presidential term and federal IG length of service. A Cramer’s V correlation test determined the 
strength of this statistical significance below.  
 
Table 9 – Correlation Test for Federal IG appointment dates and IG LOS 
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for Federal IG appointment dates by presidential term and LOS 
 
    Value Approximate Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi 0.634 0.000 
  Cramer's V 0.317 0.000 
N of Valid Cases   259   
 
Cramer’s V’s value is interpreted instead of the Phi value due to the variable types. According to 
the Cramer’s V value, it shows a weak relationship between federal IG appointment dates by 
presidential term and federal IG LOS. This shows weak relationship between the variables and 
inferencing that there a strong chance that other factors lead to federal IG LOS. Future research 
will further explain this phenomenon. 
Table 10 - Chi-Square Test for Federal departure dates by presidential term and IG LOS 
Chi-Square Test for Federal departure dates by presidential term and IG LOS 
 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 44.959a 30 0.039 
Likelihood Ratio 49.793 30 0.013 
N of Valid Cases 259     
a. 16 cells (38.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .42. 
67 
 
The variables for this Chi-Square test are IG departure dates categorized by presidential term and 
federal IG LOS. Both variables are nominal and includes appointed IGs prior to Bush’s first 
presidential term as they have resigned throughout Bush’s presidential term or even Obama’s 
presidential term. The Pearson Chi-Square test shows statistical significance between IG 
departure dates by presidential term and federal IG LOS. A Cramer’s V correlation test also 
determined the strength of this statistical significance below.  
 
Table 11 – Correlation Test for Federal IG departure dates and IG LOS 
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for Federal IG departure dates by presidential term and LOS 
    Value Approximate Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi 0.417 0.039 
  Cramer's V 0.186 0.039 
N of Valid Cases   259   
 
Similar to the last correlation test, Cramer’s V’s value is interpreted instead of the Phi value due 
to its variable types. According to the Cramer’s V value, it shows a very weak relationship 
between federal IG departure dates by presidential term and federal IG LOS. This correlation test 
shows a very small relationship exists between these two variables. Future research will better 
explain how presidential terms would cause IGs to resign. 
 






Table 12 – PAS IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Total PAS IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 




AIG appointment 1 22 14 10 16 63 11 
AIG departure 1 18 14 9 13 55   
IG appointment 17 14 15 10 10 66  11  
IG departure 3 8 13 10 9 43   
AIGIG appointment 4 4 0 3 0 11 2  
AIGIG departure 0 2 2 3 3 10   
Total PAS IG appointments 22 40 29 23 26 140  24 
Total PAS IG departures 4 28 29 22 25 111   
 
PASs appointed more AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs under Bush’s first presidential term in comparison 
to Obama’s first presidential term. Before Bush’s first term, there were 17 appointed IGs, the 
highest IG appointment rate in comparison to 2001 – 2017. This analysis also included prior to 
2001 PAS IG appointment and departure rates as their employment duration extended into the 
2001 – 2004 category. From Bush’s second term and Obama’s first term, there were similar rates 
of appointments and departures for AIGs and IGs as well as a decrease across all categories. This 
table also shows 69 PAS IG appointments and 57 PAS IG departures under the Bush 
administration and 49 PAS IG appointments and 47 PAS IG departures under the Obama 
administration. In short, there were more PAS IG appointments and departures under the Bush 
administration in comparison to the Obama administration. The line graph below illustrates PAS 







Graph 6 – Total PAS IG appointments and departures by presidential terms 
 
This line graph shows similar PAS IG appointment and departure rates since Bush’s second 
presidential term, raising questions for future research. The table below depicts the total DFE IG 
appointment and departure dates separated by presidential terms.  
 









































PAS IG Appointments and Departures by Presidential Terms
Total PAS IG appointments Total PAS IG departures
Total DFE IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 




AIG appointment 1 4 6 4 7 22  4 
AIG departure 1 4 5 3 7 20   
IG appointment 21 13 17 11 18 80 13  
IG departure 0 10 14 12 18 54   
AIGIG appointment 5 2 4 5 1 17 3  
AIGIG departure 2 1 3 2 1 9   
Total DFE IG appointments 27   19  27  20  26 119  20 
Total DFE IG departures  3  15  22  17  26 83   
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The results from the PAS are similar to DFE. This analysis also included prior to 2001 DFE IG 
appointment rates as their employment duration extended into the 2001 – 2004 category. 
Between Bush’s second term and Obama’s first term, there is a decrease in appointment and 
departure rates for AIGS and IGs. During Obama’s second term, AIG and IG appointment and 
departure rates increased. Under the Bush administration, there were 46 DFE IG appointments 
and 37 DFE IG departures. Under the Obama administration, there were 46 DFE IG 
appointments and 43 DFE IG departures. Lastly, there were larger differences between 
appointment and departure rates for PAS IGs than DFE IGs. The line graph below illustrates the 
noticeable differences between DFE IG appointments and departures by presidential terms. 
 
Graph 7 – Total DFE IG appointments and departures by presidential terms 
 
Although DFE IG appointments and departures follow the same trend as PAS IG appointments 
and departures, the difference is wider for DFE IGs. Future research should explore the factors 


































DFE IG Appointments and Departures by Presidential Terms
Total DFE IG appointments Total DFE IG departures
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In short, DFE and PAS IG appointment and departure rates are similar and share the same 
attrition problem. There were more IG appointments and departures under the Bush 
administration for PAS IGs (69 and 57) in comparison to DFE IGs (46 and 37) under the same 
administration. Similar to Kempf’s research findings, OIGs were less productive during the 
Obama administration in comparison to the Bush administration. This decrease in productivity 
during the Obama administration also shares lower rates in IG appointments and departures, 
specifically under PAS IGs. In short, not only were OIGs less productive under the Obama 
administration, they were lower rates of attrition, which probably means the OIGs were less 
aggressive in their audits and investigations. If OIGs are too aggressive or more productive as 
they were under the Bush administration, there are much higher rates of IG attrition. Although 
this is an explanation for IG attrition, other external factors such as “widespread house cleaning” 
could have also occurred. Under the Bush administration, Paul Light even urged President Bush 
to think twice about replacing the IGs serving under his administration and to keep them around 
for continuity. This concern is not foreign because under presidential transitions, it is common to 
“clean house” and attempt to fire all staff members (Lunney, 2001). This can also be another 
argument to convert DFE OIGs to PAS OIGs as mentioned in the literature review and will be 
discussed further in the policy recommendations chapter. 
 
For federal OIGs, below are the AIGs who only served as AIGs and were not appointed to IGs’ 






Graph 8 – Federal AIG Length of Service 
 
 
*Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction does not require Senate confirmation. 
 
From the graph above, most federal OIGs from 2001 – 2017 either had an AIG that served for 
less than one year (28) or served for one year (31). Out of the 28 IGs that served for less than one 
year, 8 of them were at DFE OIGs while 20 were at PAS OIGs. The rates are similar for AIGs 
serving for one year. Ten AIGs have served their current position for more than three years (3 – 
6 years) and are all from PAS OIGs. In short, AIGs serving their position for extended periods 
(more than three years) appears to occur within PAS OIGs and not DFE OIGs. The AIG with the 
longest employment duration (six years) is Mary Kendall at the Department of the Interior. 
Kendall was nominated to serve as IG in 2015 but the Senate never approved the nomination.  
 
Below are the AIGs appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms. The 
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in a presidential term divided by the number of appointed IGs in the same presidential term, 
multiplied by 100 to give us the attrition percentage. 
 
Table 14 – Federal AIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Federal AIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
Presidential Term 2001 - 2004   2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
AIG Appointment 26 20 14 23 
AIG Departure 22 19 12 20 
Wastage Rate 85% attrition 95% attrition 86% attrition 87% attrition 
 
During Bush’s first presidential term (2001 – 2004), 26 AIGs were appointed and 22 resigned, 
calculating to 85% wastage rate. Bush’s second presidential term (2005 – 2008) calculated to 
95% wastage rate and was the highest wastage rate in comparison to Obama’s first and second 
term. The AIGs in this table only officially served as an AIG once from 2001 – 2017. 
Below are federal IGs who were AIGs for the same agency multiple times at different times but 
never appointed to IG from 2001 – 2017. 
Table 15 – Federal AIGs never appointed to IG 










(Bush 1st term) 





PAS 1 year 1 year >1 year 
(Bush 1st term) 
(Bush 2nd term) 
(Bush 2nd term) 
Dennis 
Schindel 
Department of the 
Treasury  
PAS 1 year 1 year 0 
(Bush 1st term) 
(Obama 1st term) 
Anne 
Sigmund 
Department of State 
and Broadcasting 
Board of Governors 




(Bush 1st term) 






DFE 1 year 1 year 2 years 
(Bush 1st term) 
(Bush 2nd term) 
(Obama 2nd term) 
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Except for Deborah Stover-Springer, the other four federal IGs served as PAS OIGs and served 
at a year at most as AIG before returning to their previous position as Deputy or Assistant IG. 
Most of the AIG terms were under the Bush administration. There also appears to be a 
connection between AIGs and PAS OIGs serving multiple terms but never appointed to IG. In 
short, depending on the type of presidential administration, AIGs may not be appointed to IGs, 
regardless of their multiple appointments as AIGs. 
 
For federal OIGs, below are the IG length of service rates from 2001 – 2017. This list does not 
include IGs who previously served as AIGs in the same agency and appointed to IG. The Special 
IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction was categorized under PAS. 
 




































































From the bar graph above, the norm length of service rate is three years, with 19 IGs serving for 
three years from 2001 – 2017. The next norm length of service rate is two years, followed by five 
years. 13 IGs who served seven-year terms and 12 IGs that served nine-year terms. Seven IGs 
served 20+ year terms. There are more DFE IGs than PAS IGs, with more DFE IGs serving 10+ 
years compared to PAS IGs. The IG that served the longest term is A. Roy Lavik at Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (DFE) and served for 28 years. In short, it appears that DFE IGs 
have longer employment duration than PAS IGs from 2001 – 2017. 
 
The table below shows the appointment and departure dates of IGs as well as the calculated 
wastage rate. 
Table 16 – Federal IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Federal IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
Presidential Term 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
IG Appointment 27  32 21 28 
IG Departure 18  27 22 27 
Wastage Rate 67% attrition 84% attrition 104% attrition 96% attrition 
 
According to the table above explaining IG wastage rates from 2001 – 2017, the highest wastage 
rates are during Bush’s second presidential term (2005 – 2008), and Obama’s first and second 
presidential term (2009 – 2012 and 2013 – 2017).  
 







Graph 10 – Federal AIGIG Length of Service 
 
 
From the graph above, AIGIGs served between 1 – 17 years from 2001 – 2017. Out of the 28 
IGs, 17 are DFE appointed and 10 are PAS appointed. The findings here show that DFE OIGs 
appoint more AIGIGs to IGs in comparison to PAS OIGs. The AIGIGs who only served for one 
year are Clark Ervin at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG and Glenn Fine at the 
U.S. Department of Justice. In short, appointments to IG without first serving as AIG at the same 
OIG may lead to longer terms.  
Table 17 – Federal AIGIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Federal AIGIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
Presidential Term 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
AIGIG Appointment 6  4 8 1 
AIGIG Departure 3  5 5 4 



























According to the table above, the highest wastage rates were during Bush’s second presidential 
term and Obama’s second presidential term. Given the small sample size, Wastage Rates for 
AIGIGs should not be compared to the AIG or IG Wastage Rates. Additionally, although federal 
OIGs are required to appoint an AIG if an IG position is vacant, there are flaws with this process 
that may have led to the low rates of AIGIG and will be discussed later. The Crude Employee 
Attrition Model calculates IG attrition by dividing the average appointed IGs multiplied by 100 
per presidential term. The equation results are in the table below.  
 
Table 18 – Crude Employee Attrition Model for Federal IGs 
Crude Employee Attrition Model (Federal IG departures/average appointed Federal IGs) 
Position Type 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
AIG 146% 126% 80% 133% 
IG 90% 135% 110% 135% 
AIGIG 75% 125% 125% 100% 
Total IG Attrition 110% 130% 100% 130% 
 
The Crude Employee Attrition Model results show us that AIGs have the highest rates of 
attrition in 2001 – 2004 (146%) and in 2013 – 2017 (133%). For IGs, the highest rates of attrition 
are in 2005 – 2008 and 2013 – 2017 (135%). For AIGs appointed to IGs, the highest rates are in 
2005 – 2008 and 2009 – 2012 (125%). Lastly, the total IG attrition rates are highest in 2005 – 
2008 and 2013 – 2017 (130%). Overall, IG attrition was highest throughout presidential second 
terms for Bush (2005 – 2008) and Obama (2013 – 2017). In short, it could be possible that 
presidential transition is likely to cause IG attrition. Below are the total wastage rate percentages 





Table 19 – Federal IG Wastage rate 
Federal IG Wastage rate 
Presidential Term 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
Total IG appointments 59 56 43 52 
Total IG departures 43 51 39 51 
Total Wastage rate 73% 91% 91% 98% 
 
From the total Wastage rate percentages since Obama’s second term, the wastage rate has 
increased dramatically from 73% since Obama’s first term. The federal IG Wastage Rate results 
are similar to the Crude Employee Attrition results, where the increase started from Bush’s 
second term and continued until the end of the Obama Administration.  
 
Based on our analysis of federal IGs, most federal AIGs served from less than one year to two 
years from 2001 – 2017, with other federal AIGs that served towards six years. Federal IGs 
normally serve two to three years while federal AIGIGs serve five to six years. The longest IG 
employment duration is 28 years while the longest AIGIG employment duration is 17 years. 
Lastly, a statistical test determined that there is a moderate relationship between IG appointment 
type for federal OIGs and number of AIGs. Our results also found a statistical relationship 
between federal AIG, IG, AND AIGIG appointment/departure dates by presidential terms and 
the IGs’ LOS but this relationship is weak and future research will explain this problem. 
 
For the analysis on State OIGs, 47 State OIGs (Florida, Illinois, and New York State) were 
selected to represent state IG attrition because they are the top three states with the most State 
OIGs (Exhibit 3). Out of the 47 State OIGs, there were 136 AIG/IG/AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017. 
Out of the 136, there were 14 officially appointed AIGs, 118 IGs, and 5 AIGIGs. One of the IGs 
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in this sample was re-appointed at their agency and was re-counted due to their reappointment. 
The rates of AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs for the 47 State OIGs are below. 
 
Graph 11 – Number of IGs that FL, IL, and NY State OIGs appointed 
 
Note: This graph includes AIGs reappointed at the same agency. 
 
Most State OIGs appointed between two to three IGs from 2001 – 2017. Many State OIGs 
appointed only one IG within the same period. The State OIG with six to eight appointed IGs are 





















Number of State IGs appointed to OIGs
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Table 20 – State IG Length of Service 
 
State IG Length of Service 
IG Category LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median LOS mode 
AIG >1 year 2 years >1 year >1 year 
IG >1 year 25 years 9 years 2 years 
AIGIG 3 years 6 years 3 years 3 years 
 
State AIGs normally served from less than one year to two years and do not share the same 
problem as federal AIGs serving for extended periods. State IGs have served from less than one 
year to 25 years. Lastly, State AIGIGs served between three to six years with most of them 
serving three years. The table below categorizes the State IG appointment and departure rates by 
presidential terms.  
 
Table 21 – State IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Total State IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
  >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 Total 
AIG appointment 0 3 4 1 6 15 
AIG departure 0 1 4 3 4 13 
IG appointment 24 22 22 31 19 124 
IG departure 1 14 13 30 20 83 
AIGIG appointment 0 1 0 2 2 5 
AIGIG departure 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Total IG appointments 24 26 26 34 27 144 
Total IG departures 1 15 18 33 24 98 
 
According to the table above, there were few AIG appointments/departures and even less AIGIG 






Graph 12 – Total State IG appointments and departures by presidential terms 
 
Since Obama’s first presidential administration, the difference between total State IG 
appointments and departures decreased until the end of Obama’s second administration. It 
appears that State IG appointments and departures will continue to share the same rates in future 
presidential administrations. These findings question the relationship between IG appointment 
dates and IG LOS. The following Chi-Square test determined the statistical relationship between 
the two variables below. 
 
Table 22 – Chi-Square Test for State IG appointment dates and State IG LOS 




































Total State IG Appointments and Departures by Presidential Terms
IG appointment IG departure
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 63.460a 20 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 79.967 20 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 137     
a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.40. 
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The variables for this Chi-Square test are State IG appointment dates by presidential terms and 
State IG LOS. The State IG appointment dates variable has the following categories: a) before 
2001, 2001 – 2004, 2005 – 2008, 2009 – 2012, and 2013 – 2017. Although the Chi-Square test 
shows statistical significance, the Cramer’s V correlation test below tested the strength of the 
relationship. 
 
Table 23 – Correlation Test for State IG appointment dates and State IG LOS 
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for State IG appointment dates by presidential term and State IG LOS 
    Value Approximate Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi 0.68 0 
  Cramer's V 0.34 0 
N of Valid Cases   137   
 
A Cramer’s V correlation value of 0.34 is a weak positive correlation for this statistical 
significance relationship. In short, depending on which presidential term an IG was appointed 
would affect their LOS but slightly. It could also be external events occurring within the 
presidential term that causes the statistical relationship and will be discussed in future research.  
Average appointment rates per presidential term are three for AIG, 21 for IG, and 1 for AIGIG 
and allow us to calculate the following Crude Employee Attrition for State IGs. 
 
Table 24 – Chi-Square Test for State IG departure dates and State IG LOS 
Chi-Square Test for State IG departure dates by presidential term and State IG LOS 
 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.417a 25 0.386 
Likelihood Ratio 29.901 25 0.386 
N of Valid Cases 137     
a. 25 cells (69.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06. 
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The variables for this Chi-Square test are State IG departure dates by presidential terms and State 
IG LOS. The State IG departure dates variable has the following categories: a) before 2001, 2001 
– 2004, 2005 – 2008, 2009 – 2012, 2013 – 2017, and present (IG did not resign at the end of 
2017). This Chi-Square test is not statistically significant which means there is no relationship 
between an IG’s LOS and under which presidential term they resigned. 
 
Table 25 – Crude Employee Attrition Model for State IGs 
Crude Employee Attrition Model (State IG departures/average appointed IGs) 
Position Type >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
AIG 0% 33% 133% 100% 133% 
IG 33% 105% 105% 143% 95% 
AIGIG 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Total IG Attrition 4% 60% 72% 132% 96% 
The results from the Crude Employee Attrition Model find that total IG attrition was the highest 
starting from Bush’s second presidential term to Obama’s first term and continuing into Obama’s 
second term. These attrition patterns are the opposite in comparison to the federal IG Crude 
Employee Attrition Rates. Below are the total wastage rate percentages for AIGs, IGs, and 
AIGIGs.  
 
Table 26 – State IG Wastage rate 
State IG Wastage rate 
Presidential Term >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
Total IG appointments 24 26 26 34 27 
Total IG departures 1 15 18 33 24 
Total Wastage rate 4.20% 58% 69% 97% 89% 
 
The Wastage Rate results are similar to the Crude Employee Attrition Model results where the 
wastage rates are highest from 2005 – 2008 and continues onto 2013 – 2017. The breakdown 
analysis of our results here are below starting with FL, then IL, and finally NY State IGs. 
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This dissertation selected 31 FL State OIGs as its sample size to represent the total FL State 
OIGs. Out of the selected 31 FL State OIGs, 10 AIGs and 90 IGs were appointed from 2001 – 
2017. Not all FL State OIGs publically disclosed historical data to preserve confidentiality, 
especially law enforcement agencies. From 2001 – 2017, there were no officially appointed 
AIGIGs. AIGIGs that served as AIG for a brief period and not officially designated as AIG were 
labeled as IG, resulting no officially reported FL AIGIGS from 2001 – 2017.  
 
Graph 13 – Number of IGs that FL OIGs appointed 
 
The FL OIG that appointed eight IGs is the FL Department of Corrections and the FL OIG that 
appointed seven IGs is the FL Department of Children and Families. 18 FL OIGs appointed two 
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The following table illustrates a list of FL IGs who served in multiple FL OIGs as either AIG or 
IG from 2001 – 2017 for at least a year. OIG 1 is the first federal OIG served followed by OIG 2, 
the second federal OIG served, etc. 
 
Table 27 – FL IGs that served in multiple FL OIGs 
Name OIG 1 OIG 1 
LOS 
OIG 2 OIG 2 
LOS 
OIG 3 OIG 3 
LOS 
Jim Boyd Florida Supreme 
Courts 
4 years Agency for Health 
Care Administration 





Dawn Case Department of 
Children and 
Families 





Office of Early 
Learning 
1 year 
Ken Chambers Florida Supreme 
Courts 






Robert Clift Department of 
Financial Services 
3 years Department of 
Transportation 
7 years N/A N/A 
F. Marvin 
Doyal 
State Board of 
Administration 
2 years Agency for Persons 
with Disabilities 
2 years N/A N/A 
Candie Fuller Department of 
Environmental 
Protection 
7 years Department of 
Community Affairs 
3 years Department of 
State 
2 years 
Derry Harper Office of the Chief 
Inspector General 
4 years State University 
System of Florida 
Board of Governors 
6 years N/A N/A 
Chris Hirst Department of 
Children and 
Families 
1 year Florida Housing 
Finance Corporation 
5 years N/A N/A 
Linda Keen Department of 
Health 







System of Florida 
Board of Governors 
11 years Department of 
Transportation 





Department of Elder 
Affairs 
2 years Office of Chief 
Inspector General 
6 years State Board of 
Administration 
>1 year 
Eric Miller Agency for Health 
Care Administration 
6 years Office of the Chief 
Inspector General 
1 year N/A N/A 
Sheryl Steckler Department of 
Children and 
Families 
6 years Palm Beach County 4 years N/A N/A 
*Joe Maleszewski also served as IG at the Department of Economic Opportunity for one year. 
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** Melinda Miguel also served as IG in many OIGs including federal. 
 
Out of the listed FL IGs here, two IGs served the same LOS in both positions as IG. Five FL IGs 
served a shorter term in their first appointment as IG and a longer term in their second 
appointment. Six FL IGs served a longer term in their first appointment as IG and a shorter term 
in their second appointment.  
 
Graph 14 – Number of AIGs for each FL OIG 
 
From the graph above, only five FL OIGs had AIGs serving from 2001 – 2017. Most FL OIGs 
do not officially appoint AIGs. It is likely that FL OIGs have AIGs but for a short LOS and was 
normally unreported. It appears that appointing AIGs for an extended period is more apparent at 
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Graph 15 – Number of IGs for each FL OIG 
 
From the graph above, most FL OIGs appointed two to three IGs from 2001 – 2017. The FL OIG 
that had six IGs within this time was the FL Agency for Health Care Administration. In sum, 
most FL OIGs do not appoint AIGs for extended periods. FL AIGs appointed to IGs (AIGIGs) 
often have short transitional periods/almost effective immediately and unreported.  
Table 28 – FL IG Length of Service overview 
FL IG Length of Service overview 
IG Category LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median LOS mode 
AIG >1 year 2 years >1 year >1 year 
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Most FL AIGs serve at their position for less than one year. The maximum LOS for AIGs is two 
years. The few AIGs that served for two years were not appointed to IGs. Below is the 
breakdown of FL IG LOS from 2001 – 2017. 
 
Graph 16 – FL IG Length of Service 
 
From the table above, most FL IGs serve between one to three years and six years. An IG that 
served within the 20+ years’ group is James Matthews at the FL Department of Economic 
Opportunity. Tim Boyer served 22 years at the FL St. Johns River Water Management District. 
Boyer also served as the Director of Management Audits before his position as IG from August 
24, 1987 through September 30, 1994 and appointed IG on October 1, 1994. The table below 




































































Table 29 – FL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Total FL IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
  >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 Total 
AIG appointment 0 2 4 1 4 11 
AIG departure 0 1 3 3 3 11 
IG appointment 18 15 13 28 17 96 
IG departure 0 12 9 24 17 66 
AIGIG appointment 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AIGIG departure 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total IG appointments 18 17 17 29 21 107 
Total IG departures 0 13 12 27 20 77 
 
From the table above describing FL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms, 
the largest increase of FL IG appointment and departure is during Bush’s second term and during 
Obama’s first term as president. The differences between the appointment and departure rates 
slowly decreased over the presidential administrations. The line graph below illustrates this 
finding. 
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The relationship between FL IG appointment dates and FL IG LOS is statistically tested using 
the Chi-Square test below. 
 
Table 30 – Chi-Square Test for FL IG appointment dates and FL IG LOS 
Chi-Square Test for FL IG appointment dates categorized by presidential terms and FL IG LOS  
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 50.671a 20 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 63.575 20 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 102     
a. 27 cells (90.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.17 
 
This Chi-Square test used FL IG hire dates categorized by presidential terms and FL IG LOS as 
the independent and dependent variables. In statistically testing this relationship, our Chi-Square 
test shows a statistical relationship between the variables. The Cramer’s V Correlation test 
determines the strength of this statistical significance below. 
 
Table 31 – Correlation Test for FL IG appointment dates and FL IG LOS 
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for FL IG appointment dates by presidential term and FL IG LOS 
    Value Approximate Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi 0.705 0.000 
  Cramer's V 0.352 0.000 
N of Valid Cases   102   
 
Given the variables types for this analysis, the Cramer’s V’s value shows a weak statistical 
relationship. Similar to the previous Cramer’s V Correlation tests, there appears to be more 
factors during the presidential term that causes the IG’s LOS. Future research will analyze the 





Table 32 – Chi-Square Test for FL IG departure dates and FL IG LOS 
Chi-Square Test for FL IG departure dates categorized by presidential terms and FL IG LOS  
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.934a 25 0.466 
Likelihood Ratio 33.408 25 0.121 
N of Valid Cases 102     
a. 31 cells (86.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .34 
 
This Chi-Square test determined no statistical relationship between FL IG departure dates 
categorized by presidential term and their LOS. Future research should focus on factors that lead 
to FL IG resignation and if there are certain times, where it is more prevalent. 
 
An analysis of 31 FL State IG attrition found that most FL AIGs served for less than one year 
and at a maximum of two years. Most IGs served one to three years, with the longest serving FL 
IG’s LOS at 22 years. Lastly, there were no reported AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017, and if there 
were, the term served as AIG was very short and unreported. Our results also found a weak 
statistical relationship similar to the federal IGs, where FL IG appointment dates were 
statistically significant to LOS but has a weak correlation.  
 
This dissertation selected 11 IL State OIGs as its sample size to represent the total IL State OIGs. 
Two IL OIGs that had four IGs appointed from 2001 – 2017 is the IL Department of Healthcare 







Graph 18 – Number of IGs that IL OIGs appointed 
 
Out of the selected 11 IL OIGs, there were 3 appointed AIGs, 20 IGs, and 4 AIGIGs. Four IL 
OIGs appointed one IG, while 6 OIGs appointed two to four IGs. Additionally, James Wright 
served as IG in two different agencies. Wright served as the IG for the IL State Toll Highway 
Authority OIG from October 2003 to June 2005 and as the IG for the IL Office of Executive 























Number of Illinois IGs appointed to OIGs
93 
 
Graph 19 – Number of AIGs for each IL OIG 
 
According to the graph above and similar to the FL OIGs, most IL OIGs did not appoint an AIG 
from 2001 – 2017. Only two IL OIGs appointed one AIG and the IL General Assembly, Office 
of the Legislative Inspector General appointed two AIGs. The table below shows the number of 
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Graph 20 – Number of IGs for each IL OIG 
 
IL OIGs had between one to four IGs from 2001 – 2017. Five IL OIGs only had one appointed 
IG within this period and four IL OIGs had two appointed IGs. Only two IL OIGs appointed 
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Graph 21 – Number of AIGIGs for each IL OIG 
 
According to the graph above, most IL OIGs did not have AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017. The IL 
OIGs that did have an AIGIG are the IL Department of Human Resources, IL Office of 
Executive Inspector General for the Agencies of the Illinois Governor, and IL State Toll 
Highway Authority OIG. Similar to FL AIGIGs, IL AIGIGs are also uncommon. The table 
below depicts IL IG LOS rates. 
 
Table 33 – IL IG Length of Service overview 
IL IG Length of Service overview 
IG Category LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median LOS mode 
AIG >1 year 2 years 1 year >1 year 
IG 2 years 25 years 5 years 5 years 
AIGIG 3 years 6 years 3 years 3 years 
 
According to the IL IG LOS rates from 2001 – 2017, AIGs normally served between less than 
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IGs. The IL IG LOS minimum is two years with its maximum as 25 years. The IL IG with the 
longest IG employment duration is Denise Kane at the Department of Children and Family 
Services. Most IL IGs from 2001 – 2017 served up to five years. Lastly, AIGIGs served a 
minimum of three years, a maximum of six years, and generally serve three years.  
 
Table 34 Total IL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Total IL IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
  >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 Total 
AIG appointment 0 1 0 0 2 3 
AIG departure 0 0 1 0 1 2 
IG appointment 1 7 5 2 1 17 
IG departure 0 1 3 4 3 12 
AIGIG appointment 0 1 0 1 2 4 
AIGIG departure 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Total IG appointments 1 9 5 3 5 24 
Total IG departures 0 1 5 4 4 16 
 
The table above illustrates IL IG appointment and departure dates separated by presidential 
appointments. Most IL IG appointments were during the second Bush administration and during 
Obama’s first administration. The highest rates of IL IG departure was from 2009 – 2012. These 
rates are similar to the federal OIGs during Bush’s second term and Obama’s first term, where 









Graph 22 – Total IL IG appointments and departures by presidential terms 
 
IL IG appointment and departure rates do not share the same trend as federal or FL IG 
appointment and departure rates. Future research should focus on the inconsistent differences 
between the two rates. The Chi-Square test determining the statistical relationship between IL IG 
appointment dates and IL IG LOS is below. 
 
Table 35 – Chi-Square Test for IL IG appointment dates and IL IG LOS 
Chi-Square Test for IL IG appointment dates by presidential terms and IL IG LOS 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.541a 16 0.003 
Likelihood Ratio 35.500 16 0.003 
N of Valid Cases 26     
a. 25 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23. 
 
The variables for this Chi-Square test are IL IG appointment dates categorized by presidential 
terms and IL IG LOS rates. According to the statistical test above and sharing similar results to 
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statistically significant. The following Cramer’s V correlation determines the strength of this 
statistical relationship. 
 
Table 36 – Correlation Test for IL IG appointment dates and IL IG LOS 
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for IL IG appointment dates by presidential term and IL IG LOS 
    Value Approximate Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi 1.169 0.003 
  Cramer's V 0.585 0.003 
N of Valid Cases   26   
 
According to our Cramer’s V value, it shows that there is a moderate relationship (0.585) 
between the two variables. This correlation test result should be analyzed lightly, as the sample 
size is small and can only make conceptual inferences that there is a relationship between IL IG 
appointment dates and IL IG LOS. The following test determines the relationship between IL IG 
departure dates and IL IG LOS. 
 
Table 37 – Chi-Square Test for IL IG departure dates and IL IG LOS 
Chi-Square Test for IL IG appointment dates by presidential terms and IL IG LOS 
  Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.125a 20 0.162 
Likelihood Ratio 31.140 20 0.052 
N of Valid Cases 26     
a. 30 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15. 
 
According to the Chi-Square test results above, there is no statistical relationship between IL IG 
appointment dates by presidential terms and IL IG LOS. Future research should focus on the 




Below are the rates of IL AIG, IG, and AIGIG attrition rates separated by presidential terms. 
Wastage rate is not calculated because the rates are too low for accurate interpretation. 
 
Table 38 – IL AIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
IL AIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
Presidential Term >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
AIG Appointment 0 1 0 0 2 
AIG Departure 0 0 1 0 1 
 
From the table above, there were only four IL AIG appointment from 2001- 2018, one departure 
under Bush’s second term and another under Obama’s second term.  
 
Table 39 – IL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
IL IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
Presidential Term >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
IG Appointment 4 7 5 2 1 
IG Departure 0 2 3 4 3 
 
Under Bush’s first term, seven IL IGs were appointed during this time and five were appointed 
under his second term. The appointment rates dropped throughout the Obama administration. 
Throughout the two presidential terms, only one IL IG resigned.  
 
Table 40 – IL AIGIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
 
IL AIGIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
Presidential Term >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 
AIGIG Appointment 0 1 0 1 2 
AIGIG Departure 0 0 1 0 0 
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During Obama’s second term, two IL AIGIGs were appointed. Throughout the two presidential 
terms, only one IL AIGIG resigned in 2001 – 2017.  
 
An analysis of 11 IL State OIGs found IL AIGs normally served for less than one year, at a 
maximum length of two years. IL IGs normally served five years with a LOS maximum of 25 
years. Lastly, IL AIGIGs normally serve three years at a maximum of six years. Similar to the 
FL IG statistical test results, IL IG hire/departure date is statistically significant to their length of 
service. In this statistical significance, there is moderate correlation; however, as mentioned 
earlier this result should be examined lightly due to its low sample size. 
 
This dissertation selected five NY State OIGs as its sample size to represent the total NY State 
OIGs. From 2001 – 2017, there were no officially appointed NY state AIGs.  
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NY State OIGs appointed between 1 – 3 State OIGs from 2001 – 2017. Two NY State OIGs had 
two IGs from 2001 – 2017 while one NY State OIG had three IGs. 
 
Graph 24 – Number of IGs for each NY State OIG 
 
Similar to IL OIGs, NY State OIGs appointed 1 – 3 IGs from 2001 – 2017. Catherine Scott was 
the only appointed NY State IG from 2001 – 2017. She also served as AIG for one year before 
appointed to IG. Since her appointment in February 2012, Scott served at the NY State OIG for 
five years. 
 
Table 41 – NY IG Length of Service overview 
NY IG Length of Service overview 
IG Category LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median LOS mode 
IG >1 year 18 years 5 years N/A 
Note: AIG and AIGIG Length of Service is removed as no AIGs were appointed and Catherine Scott was 
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Kimberly O’Connor served for less than one year at the NY State Office of Medicaid Inspector 
General and Sherill Spatz served for 18 years at the NY State Unified Court System OIG – 
Judicial Appointments. The next NY State IG with the longest LOS is Barry Kluger, serving 11 
years at the NY Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) OIG.  
 
Table 42 – Total NY IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms 
Total NY IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms 
  >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017 Total 
AIG appointment 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AIG departure 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IG appointment 2 0 4 1 1 8 
IG departure 1 0 1 2 0 4 
AIGIG appointment 0 0 0 1 0 1 
AIGIG departure 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total IG appointments 2 0 4 2 1 9 
Total IG departures 1 0 1 2 0 4 
 
From the table above, most NY State IGs were appointed during the second Bush administration 
and continued their service after 2017. Out of the five NY State OIGs, there were no reported 
AIGs and only one reported AIGIG. NY State IGs normally serve for five years and a LOS 










Graph 25 – Total NY IG appointments and departures by presidential terms 
 
 
Although the sample size is low for NY State IGs, their appointment and departure rates are very 
close to each other at the end of Obama’s second term. NY State IGs were not statistically tested 
or analyzed further for appointment and departure trends due to its low sample size to avoid 
misleading results. Future research should analyze the rates appointment and departure rates of 
NY State IGs and compare their attrition rates to other state OIGs. 
 
An analysis of the majority of FL, IL, and NY State IGs found low rates of AIGs and AIGIGs. 
Reported AIGs served from less than one year to three years. The statistical test results were 
similar to the federal IG test results, indicating statistical significance between hire dates and 
























Total New York State IG Appointments and Departures by 
Presidential Terms
Total NY appointments Total NY departures
104 
 
and LOS offers a possible explanation for the LOS duration. Other external factors not captured 
in this analysis could explain LOS duration. 
 
In short, the problem with AIGs serving for extended periods only exists at the federal level. 
Federal AIGs can serve up to six years while State AIGs generally serve for short periods of time 
with an IG appointment following shortly afterwards. There were also reported rates of State 
AIGs serving at the same agency for multiple periods and never appointed to IGs. Lastly, IG 
service period (hire/departure dates) is statistically significant to IG LOS rates.  
 
This analysis on IG attrition encountered the following statistical limitations. 
1) State IG attrition findings can only make inferences about attrition rates and problems in 
other states outside of this analysis. Given the unique nature of each individual state, 
generalizations may lead to misleading results and should be independently studied. For 
example, findings from FL IG attrition rates cannot be generalized to Texas, California, 
or other states.  
2) Standard attrition models are normally used for large organizations and not for measuring 
attrition rates similar to IGs with small sample sizes. Percentages produced by the 
attrition models used in this analysis should not be compared with large organizations 
and should only be compared to other similar organizations, such as other OIGs with 
small sample sizes. Otherwise, a comparison between wastage rates from this analysis 
and other studies will lead to misleading results. For example, it is not safe to assume that 
80% wastage rate in an OIG holds the same attrition problems as 80% wastage rate in 
Oklahoma Department of Corrections. 
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3) Statistical tests in this dissertation held a low sample size due to the limited number of 
existing IGs and OIGs. The federal and state OIGs analyzed in this dissertation project 
are not merged together into one sample size and causes a low sample size for each 
jurisdiction. These two OIGs categories cannot be merged together given their 
differences in roles and responsibilities and were analyzed separately in this dissertation 
project.  
4) LOS analysis results are categorized by presidential terms but does not quite mean it is 
the president’s term, presence, or actions that cause the IGs’ LOS. It is very possible that 
external factors occurring within the same period have caused the changes in IG 
appointments departures, and length of service, especially at the state jurisdiction. 
5) This dissertation project does not capture all federal and state OIG and IG attrition rates 
due to loss of data, poor record keeping, and confidentiality policies. However, the 
samples collected are large enough to represent the entire population for each 
jurisdiction.  
6) AIG, IG, AIGIG appointment and departure dates are categorized and analyzed by year 
due to loss of data, conflictions between hire, appointment, and official start dates, and 
other related data complications. 
 
Regardless of the statistical limitations, the methodology findings allowed us to identify the IG 
attrition problem, leading to an analysis of their respective statutes for policy recommendations. 
According to Paul Light, many IGs under the Carter and Reagan administration found their OIGs 
upon arrival requiring major overhaul and was extremely short on staff. Many IGs found that 
there was inflexible regulations, lack of rewards for staff, and high turnover among core 
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employees (1993, p. 93). The Carter and Reagan administration IGs also claimed dealing with 
Congress and the media to be the most difficult parts of their jobs. The major source of their 
frustration stemmed from their agency resisting to change, lack of resources to perform their job 
efficiently, the slowness of government decision making, and turnover of political employees 
(1993, p. 97). Some of these OIG factors are likely to lead to IG attrition. Paul Light also found 
IG attrition is caused by OIGs requiring major overhaul, the agency’s resistance to change, lack 
of resources, slowness of government decision processes, and turnover of core/political 
employees. Light’s finding lead to an analysis of federal and state OIG statutes, to solve the 
following research question - What legislative, functional and structural attributes of inspector 
general offices and the agencies they oversee are associated with different rates of employment 
duration and attrition? This question prompts a discussion on the status of the Federal IG Act. 
 
The only requirement as outlined in the IG Act to appoint IGs is that candidates must be selected 
“without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated 
ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
administration, or investigations.” This IG appointment requirement is too broad and does not 
specifically outline qualification requirements such as types or levels of experience, education, 
certifications, etc. IG positions now demand a wider skill set which includes and is not limited to 
withstanding political pressure of agency employees, leadership, and promoting economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of programs (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018). 
 
In the past, survey research by GAO has given us a basic understanding of who qualifies for a 
federal IG position. In 1999, GAO conducted a research study on federal OIGs with 56 
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respondents on operational and staffing issues. In fiscal year 1997, the 56 OIGs stated that 94% 
of their staff worked in PASs and 6% of staff worked in DFEs. The staff consisted mostly of 
auditors (45%) and investigators (26%). The remaining staff were administrative (11%), analysts 
(7%), computer specialists (2%), attorneys (2%), and other (7%). Additionally, the most 
common highest degree held by PAS and DFE OIG staff was a master’s degree in business 
administration, followed by a Doctor of Jurisprudence (for DFEs). The next most common 
highest degree held by PAS and DFE staff grouped into an “other” category, consisting of 
finance, geography, psychology, and English. Lastly, the most common license held by federal 
OIG staff was the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) (14% of PAS staff and 20% of DFE staff). 
The second most common certification held was the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE). In short, 
since 1999, the norm qualifications to work at a federal OIG were to have an auditing or 
investigation background, a master’s degree or Doctor of Jurisprudence, or a Certified Public 
Accountant/Certified Fraud Examiner designation (GAO, 1999).  
 
GAO’s study also reported 19 PAS IGs having met one of the position requirements as listed in 
the IG Act – skill in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
administration, or investigations (1999). This study reported investigations (63%) being the main 
background for PAS IGs followed by public administration (47%) and law (42%). Prior to 
official appointment, PAS IGs had 6 to 32 years of experience in management, investigations, or 
other IG related positions (GAO, 1999). For DFE IGs, auditing (61%) was the main background 
instead of investigations like its presidential counterpart (most of the DFE IGs were previously 
auditors before appointed to IG). The second main background of DFE IGs was management 
analysis with only 21% of DFE IGs having an investigation background. In short, in 1999, PAS 
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IGs predominantly had an investigation background while DFE IGs had an audit background 
(GAO, 1999). Nowadays, it appears that both investigation and audit backgrounds are required to 
be an efficient IG.  
 
GAO’s 1999 study also reported the LOS and vacancies of IGs. Although they did not 
differentiate AIG, IG, and AIGIG, this study showed that most PAS IGs served 3 to 5 years and 
most DFE IGs served 0 to 2 years or 6 to 10 years. In 1998, nine IG positions were vacant with 
seven being PAS IGs and two being DFE IGs. In short, research on IG LOS and vacancies 
started since 1999. DFE IGs served either a short term or a very long term with IG vacancy being 
a norm. “It is not unusual to have vacant IG positions” (GAO, 1999). It appears that IG vacancies 
and attrition only became a recent phenomenon.  
 
In a 2011 GAO study, 62 IGs were surveyed and reported having backgrounds and degrees in 
accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, and 
investigations. Most PAS IGs have a background in criminal justice, investigations, law 
enforcement and public administration. Most DFE IGs have a background in inspections and 
evaluations, criminal justice, investigations, law enforcement, accounting and auditing, and 
financial analysis (GAO, 2011). In comparing academic degrees, 15 PAS and 12 DFE IGs held a 
law degree. 12 DFE IGs held an accounting/auditing related degree. The other degrees that IGs 
held were criminal justice/law enforcement related, management analysis, public administration, 
and other (similar to the same social sciences in the 1999 study). In regards to professional 
certifications, 28 DFE IGs reported having at least one professional certification while six PAS 
IGs reported having one. “Of the DFE IGs, 6 reported they are certified public accountants and 6 
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reported they are certified internal auditors” (GAO, 2011). Six DFE IGs reported having the 
Certified Government Financial Managers certification and seven DFE IGs reported having a 
certification not within the categories mentioned (Certified Information Officer, Certified 
Information Security Officer, and Certified Inspector General®). In short, the norm to qualify for 
an IG position is having an IG related background, academic or law degree, and a professional 
certification. The “norm” attributes of past IGs can serve as the norm or “go-to” qualifications 
for future IG appointments. 
 
Some federal OIGs would require more strict qualification requirements, especially federal IGs 
with law enforcement authority and are authorized in one of three methods – 1) the IG Act, 2) 
the Attorney General, and 3) laws outside of the IG Act. There are currently 40 federal IGs that 
have law enforcement authority, with 25 authorized by the IG Act, 10 authorized by the Attorney 
General, and the last five authorized by external laws. Law enforcement authority includes the 
following duties: a) carry a firearm while engaged in official duties, b) make an arrest without a 
warrant while engaged in official duties, and c) seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of 
premises, or seizure of evidence (Ginsberg, 2014). Law enforcement authority in OIGs also 
includes additional job responsibilities. For example, “OIGs vested with law enforcement 
authority through the IG Act must provide “periodic refresher training in trial processes; federal 
criminal and civil legal updates; interviewing techniques and policy; law of arrest, search, and 
seizure; and physical conditioning and defensive tactics” (Ginsberg, 2014). In short, OIGs with 





Law enforcement authority also raises the question if having this attribute would affect rates of 
AIGs. The Student’s T-Test between the variables Law Enforcement Authority (0 = No/ 1 = 
Yes) and AIG rates results (interval) are below.  
 
Table 43 – Student’s T-Test for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates 
Independent Student’s T-Test for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates 




























    -3.062 67.993 0.003 -0.835 0.273 -1.379 -0.291 
Based on the Independent Student’s T-Test results, there is a statistical relationship between 
having law enforcement authority and rates of AIGs. The following Eta Correlation test shows 
the strength of the statistical relationship below. 
 
Table 44 – Correlation for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates 
Eta Correlation for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates 
      Value 
Nominal by Interval Eta Law Enforcement Authority .441 
    AIG Count 0.340 
 
Because the dependent variable is AIG Count and interpreted instead of Law Enforcement 
authority, the strength of this statistical significance is weak. It appears that although there is a 
statistical relationship between federal OIGs with law enforcement authority and rates of federal 
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AIGs, there are other factors that cause high rates of federal AIGs that are otherwise not included 
in this study. Future research will focus on identifying causal factors for high rates of AIGs.  
 
In short, the Federal IG Act and its amendments do not clearly describe the position eligibility 
requirements, which have expanded heavily since its inception in 1978 and require further 
amendments to include eligibility requirements. “Ideally, inspectors general should be appointed 
through a process that leaves little doubt that the office will be run in an independent manner, 
acting according to the rule of law, and not protecting the appointer” (Salkin, 2012). Salkin’s 
aforementioned process should be detailed to ensure the strongest candidates are selected for the 
positions. In short, without clear eligibility requirements, appointed IGs may be underqualified 
for the job, which may cause IG attrition.  
 
Although the IG Act does not include specified eligibility requirements for IGs, there are specific 
details on removing an IG from office. According to H.R. 928 and S. 1723, “[a]n Inspector 
General may be removed from office prior to the expiration of his or her term only on any of 
the following grounds: (1) Permanent incapacity. (2) Inefficiency. (3) Neglect of duty. (4) 
Malfeasance. (5) Conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.” The president can 
also remove PAS IGs at any time for any reason. Although the president is required to explain their 
reasons for removal, there is no deadline for their explanations. Additionally, Congress does not 
need to notify in advance of an anticipated IG removal. According to Burrows, the only IG that has 
a fixed term is the United States Postal Service IG. In short, little explanation is required to remove 




The Association of Inspectors General’s Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspectors 
General (Green Book) details the requirements of state and local OIGs. One of their first 
requirements is that OIGs should be created as a legal entity, either by statute or by executive 
order and should detail the following: a) Mandate, b) Authority, c) Powers, d) Confidentiality, e) 
Staff Qualifications, f) Independence, and g) Whistleblower protection. Mandate is defined as 
the OIGs’ mission, departments, programs, etc. Authority is the OIGs’ functions and 
authorizations such as conducting audits and investigations. Powers is the OIGs’ access and 
limitations on their ability to subpoena documents for investigations or access to records. 
According to the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity (CAPI), as of 2016, only six 
states have searches and seizures, public hearings, and subpoena powers for their OIGs (2016). 
Additionally, 18 states only have subpoena for their OIGs while 15 states have public hearings 
and subpoena power (CAPI, 2016). OIGs must also maintain confidentiality of records and the 
identities of persons who provided information to the OIG for ongoing audits and investigations 
unless absolutely necessary to disclose to public. Additionally, the statute should outline the staff 
qualification requirements for the IG and their staff to maintain independence and provide 
protection to whistleblowers to provided complaints to the OIG. Given the value of following the 
Green Book’s standards, State IGs have uniformly followed the Green Book’s recommendations 
in establishing their OIGs across different agencies in the United States.  
 
The Florida, IL, and NY State OIG statutes are similar and adopted many of the original 
provisions from the Federal IG Act. Similar provisions included the organization mission and 
objective, dual reporting responsibilities, and following professional standards in audits and 
investigations. The IG appointment terms vary depending on the state. For examples, the 
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California State IG is appointed to a six-year term and in New Jersey, the State IG is appointed 
to a five-year term. Florida State IGs are appointed to four-year terms. Regardless of the fixed IG 
terms per state, the IG removal processes varies from state to state. For example, Ohio State IGs 
can only be removed only after written notice and giving the IG to provide a rebuttal. Texas State 
IGs can only be removed with the approval of an external board and California State IGs and NY 
State IGs can be removed only for cause. Unfortunately, Florida State IGs can easily be removed 
as any other Senior Management Service employee and sometimes without cause and at the 
discretion of the agency head (Bragg, 2010). Bragg recommends that Florida IG appointments 
and removals should also be done in conjunction with a legislative committee, making it more 
difficult to dismiss Florida State IGs and to reduce Florida state IG attrition.  
 
According to Florida Statute 20.055 Agency Inspectors General, FL State IGs are required to 
meet the following qualifications to serve as IGs.  
1. A bachelor’s degree with a major in accounting or business with five courses in 
accounting and five years of experience as an accountant, auditor (electronic data 
processing, internal, independent post auditor), or a combination of the aforementioned 
positions.  
2. A master’s degree in accounting, business administration, or public administration with 
four years of experience as an accountant, auditor (electronic data processing, internal, 
independent post auditor), or a combination of the aforementioned positions.  
3. A certified public accountant license or certified internal audit certificate issued by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors.  
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4. Florida IGs are selected based on integrity, leadership capability, background experiences 
and is subject to a level-two background check. 
5. Florida IGs must have at least five years of experience in the following areas: IG, 
managerial experience in an OIG or OIG-like agency, law enforcement officer, court 
judge, senior-level auditor/comptroller, administration and management of complex 
audits and investigations, and managing fraud prevention and detection programs in 
government or other organizations.  
Lastly, when Florida IGs are appointed, they must have or be in the process of being certified as 
an Inspector General with the Association of Inspectors General. Florida IGs must also have at 
least one of the certification designations: Certified Inspector General®, Certified Inspector 
General Auditor®, Certified Inspector General Investigator®, Certified Public Accountant, 
Certified Internal Auditor, and many other related certifications. Unfortunately, “Most Inspectors 
General are not qualified to perform assessments of state agency operations, and delegate this 
authority to the agency internal audit director. This lack of expertise by Inspectors General limits 
the ability of the OIG to identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government activities” (Hefren, 2010). According to Hefren, 25 out of the 37 Florida IGs in 2010 
were not qualified for the IG positions they held. In short, although IG position requirements are 
outlined in the Florida IG statute, it is not followed carefully and due to unqualified candidates 
serving in these positions, it may be an explanation for Florida IG attrition. 
 




Within 60 days after a vacancy or anticipated vacancy in the position of inspector 
general, the agency head or, for agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor, the Chief 
Inspector General, shall initiate a national search for an inspector general and shall set the 
salary of the inspector general. In the event of a vacancy in the position of inspector 
general, the agency head or, for agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor, the Chief 
Inspector General, may appoint other office of inspector general management personnel 
as interim inspector general until such time as a successor inspector general is appointed. 
(Florida Statute 20.055)  
This amendment addresses the need to appoint an AIG similarly to the Federal Vacancies 
Reform Act of 1998; however, rates of FL AIGs have only increased marginally since. Unlike 
the federal act, the FL statute does not impose an AIG to serve up to 210 days (or any amount of 
days). Three conceptual explanations for the continued low rates of FL AIGs are as follows.  
 
1) There is no need to officially appoint FL AIGs because FL IGs are easier to appoint in 
comparison to federal IGs. This could be caused by the nature of governmental jurisdiction, 
resources, and demand. If the appointment processes of FL IGs are easier than federal IGs, FL 
AIGs are likely to serve for very short time periods and informally, reducing the need for official 
FL AIG appointments and explaining the low rates.  
 
2) Similar to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, the context that defines vacancy is unclear and 
the Florida statute does not require an Acting official to serve a maximum of 210 days. The FL 
statute vacancy amendment also states that the Chief Inspector General may appoint other office 
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of inspector general management personnel as AIG. In short, it does not appear to be a 
requirement or urgency for FL government officials to fill vacant FL State IG immediately.  
 
3) The FL statute also mentions “anticipated vacancy”, which is broadly defined but can be 
perceived as a proactive approach to ensure short FL IG vacancies, further reducing the need for 
FL AIGs. Anticipated vacancy could be informal conversations that an IG is planning 
resignation, retirement, or pressured into resignation. Given the broad definition of anticipated 
vacancy, a clear definition should be included in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act to enforce 
the proactive approach on long term AIGs.  
 
The anticipated vacancy attribute in the Florida Statute is unique in comparison to the other 
statutes because Florida State IGs are more likely to be terminated especially for just doing their 
job too well. “Perhaps the most egregious example of an IG being removed for doing their job 
was the removal of the IG at the Department of Corrections. This IG was removed by the new 
agency head, James Crosby, and was told he was being removed in part because he had 
investigated one of Crosby’s closest associates, AC Clark. Today both Crosby and Clark are in 
federal prison for taking kickbacks from department vendors and contractors” (Bragg, 2010). 
The following section analyzes the IL OIG statutes. 
IL State has two types of IGs, Executive IGs and IGs and their statutes share many similarities 
such as both positions serving five-year terms. Both statutes were effective in fall 2003. Below 
are the list of qualifications required for IL IGs and IL Executive IGs under IL Statutes 15 ILCS 
305/14 and 5 ILCS 430/20-10. 
1. Convicted felons within the United States could not be appointed to IL IGs  
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2. A bachelor’s degree  
3. Five or more years of experiences in any or combination of the following fields: a) 
federal, state, or local law enforcement with two years of investigatory experience, b) a 
federal, state, or local prosecutor, and/or c) a federal, state, or local senior 
manager/executive.  
The Executive IG positions under 5 ILCS 430/20-10 also accepts experience as a member, 
officer, or state or federal judge. Executive IL IG positions are appointed by three-fifths of 
Senate consent while IL IGs are appointed by the Senate but does not share the same three-fifths 
rule as Executive IGs. The Executive IG statute also does not have a vacancy rule as found in IL 
Statute ILCS 305/14. As of 2018, there are low rates of IL State IGs (both executive and non-
executive IGs) in comparison to Florida and federal OIGs, making it difficult to determine if it 
would be meaningful to amend the Executive IG statute to include a vacancy rule similar to its 
counterpart.   
 
Under Illinois Statute Chapter 15. 305/14 also includes an AIG narrative similar to the FL statute 
and is below. 
The Inspector General shall serve a 5-year term.  If no successor is appointed and 
qualified upon the expiration of the Inspector General's term, the Office of Inspector 
General is deemed vacant and the powers and duties under this Section may be exercised 
only by an appointed and qualified interim Inspector General until a successor Inspector 
General is appointed and qualified.  If the General Assembly is not in session when a 
vacancy in the Office of Inspector General occurs, the Secretary of State may appoint an 
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interim Inspector General whose term shall expire 2 weeks after the next regularly 
scheduled session day of the Senate. (Illinois Statute Chapter 15. 305/14) 
According to the IL IG Statute, IGs serve five-year terms and AIGs are required to fill in vacant 
IG positions. The AIGs’ term expires in two weeks and can be appointed by the Secretary of 
State if the Senate is not in session. In short, IL AIGs are likely to be appointed, but are not 
required, and will serve a significantly shorter term than the Federal Vacancies Reform Act.  
 
According to New York State’s Executive Law Article 4-A, it outlines the establishment, 
functions, powers, and responsibilities of the New York State IG. However, this statute does not 
outline required qualifications or IG vacancy rules and is likely because there are only a few NY 
State IGs. For future research, if there is an expansion of NY State OIGs, amendments to the 
Executive Law Article should be made to outline qualification requirements and vacancy rules.  
Lastly, the New York State Executive Law Article 4-A outlines the jurisdiction, establishment, 
function, powers, and responsibilities of New York State IGs but does not discuss vacancy. A 
conceptual explanation for this lack of narrative in comparison to the federal, Florida, and 
Illinois jurisdictions is that New York State IGs is relatively new in comparison to the other 
selected jurisdictions and has the least amount of OIGs, resulting in lower demand for AIGs. If 
New York State adopts more state OIGs, it may eventually lead to the concern of more rates of 
AIGs, AIGs serving for extended periods, and lastly, an amendment to the statute regarding IG 
vacancy.  
 
In short, there are many possible explanations why there are more AIGs at the federal level in 
comparison to state. In following the AIG’s Green Book for best practices on hiring state IGs, 
119 
 
there are variations in appointment, termination, and qualification requirements across states. 
The FL State OIG statute appears to be the most detailed in terms of detailing the specific job 
requirements and handling vacancies, followed by the IL State OIG statute and NY State OIG 
statute. A likely explanation for FL’s statute (20.055) being the most detailed is because it was 
established first (1994) in comparison to IL (2003) and NY (2013 for State IG). FL State IGs 
also receive more media attention in comparison to IL and NY; possibly, because FL has the 
most state IGs and are more likely to be subject to criticism. In short, regardless of the statutes’ 
attributes, they should be more detailed in their qualification requirements and vacancies. The 
final dissertation chapter – Policy Measures to Improve IG Employment will discuss and 




























This chapter discusses current policy measures designed to reduce federal and state IG attrition, 
starting with the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. “One of the most glaring problems that 
needs to be addressed is IG vacancies. Presidents have too few incentives to appoint strong 
watchdogs, and instead leave the position vacant, sometimes for years” (POGO, 2018). In 
POGO’s article, The Watchdogs after Forty Years: Recommendations for our Nation’s Federal 
Inspectors General, they recommended that Congress amend the Federal Vacancies Reform Act 
to create an alternative approach to appoint AIGs. POGO recommended Congress to designate 
federal judges to appoint AIGs by a designated list from the CIGIE or to designate an executive 
body to appoint IGs when presidential appointment is not an option. Additionally, POGO 
recommended that Congress also amend the Federal Vacancies Reform Act to include a 
requirement for the White House to explain to Congress why a vacant IG position has exceeded 
210 days and to provide a nomination date (POGO, 2018). 
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The Federal Vacancies Reform Act requires vacant positions that require presidential 
appointment and Senate confirmation to be filled by an Acting official for up to 210 days (seven 
months). Qualified Acting officials can be any of the following: a) The first assistant to the office 
(Deputy IG or similar title), b) a different person serving in another Senate confirmed position, 
or c) senior employee within the same agency with a GS-15 pay scale or higher. In short, the 
PAS IG positions should not have AIGs serving for more than seven months. Unfortunately from 
2001 – 2018, 20 PAS IGs have served for more than one year, 11 serving up to two years, and 
ten AIGs serving between three to six years. 
 
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act is not followed carefully because its language is flawed and 
unclear. “The act doesn’t go into effect unless an executive officer “dies, resigns, or is otherwise 
unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.” There isn’t specific language about the 
scenario where an office is terminated or fired from a position” (Bomboy, 2018). More 
importantly, the Act does not define who qualifies as “the first assistant” to serve as AIG. This 
recent discussion on the Act was caused by Rod Rosenstein’s possible departure from 
Washington, and identified the problem with the Act’s undefined language in determining an 
acting replacement due to someone’s departure. In short, although the Act applies to federal IGs, 
the undefined language makes it difficult to find and appoint a federal AIG after a federal IG’s 
departure.  
 
Although unclear, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act helped increase awareness on the growing 
rates of federal AIGs serving for extended periods. If the legislature did not require PAS OIGs to 
officially appoint AIGs, Deputy IGs serving as AIGs for extended periods would go unnoticed 
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especially if given an informal but not official AIG title. Since the creation of the Reform Act in 
1998, AIG appointment rates in 2001 – 2004 increased to 26 from two prior to 2001. In other 
words, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 required the official appointment of AIGs in 
federal agencies, and exposed the OIGs with AIGs starting as early as 2001.  
 
In short, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act will need to be amended to address IG vacancies. 
Amendment options include making the language more clear on what defines vacancy and what 
would qualify as vacancy. For example, the confusion between being asked to resign or 
termination should both hold the same definition. The Act should also specify who would qualify 
as a First Assistant, such as providing title examples such as Deputy IG, First Assistant IG, etc. 
Lastly, the Act should enforce the 210 days rule as suggested by POGO or at least require the 
White House provide an explanation.  
 
“GAO and the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which preceded the Council of 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), had found that the internal audit offices 
of small federal agencies lacked independence and provided inadequate coverage of important 
programs that could benefit from independent oversight by an IG” (Davis, 2014). This lack of 
independence can be resolved by following Burrows’ recommendation, where DFE IGs should 
be converted to PAS IGs. The conversion from DFE to PAS should increase independence, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and may reduce the reported AIG attrition problem. This will also 
address the DFE OIG productiveness problem Kempf has identified in her research. As 
recommended by GAO, below are their alternatives to converting DFE OIGs to PAS OIGs to 
reduce IG attrition.  
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1. Converting some DFE IGs to PAS IGs, 
2. Converting all DFE IGs into PAS IGs. 
3. Converting some or all DFE IGs into PAS IGs but including a sunset provision. 
The best approach is to continue converting DFE IGs into PAS IGs to eventually have all federal 
IGs as PAS IGs. GAO reported “some concerns about creating and maintaining small IG offices 
with limited resources, where an IG might not have the ability to obtain the technical skills and 
expertise needed to provide adequate and cost- effective oversight. In the final analysis, the 
determination of whether to place IGs in specific agencies is a policy decision to be decided by 
the Congress” (Davis, 2014). It short, it is more than just an increase in independence for federal 
IGs if they were all converted to PAS. There already exists a concern on maintaining DFE OIGs 
based on budget and staff qualifications. This is also another argument that the current IG Act 
should be amended to include specific qualification requirements.  
 
In sum, if all DFE IGs are converted to PAS, federal IGs will become more efficient, effective, 
independent, and productive. The procedure for conversion should be the same for the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Tennessee Valley Authority, as both agencies had 
successful transitions. For DFEs without IGs, they should receive oversight from the PAS OIGs 
on a case-by-case basis instead of either appointing a DFE IG or having another DFE OIG 
provide oversight on a case-by-case basis. This movement will reduce the current rates of DFE 
OIGs and to reduce the need for DFE OIGs to have oversight over multiple DFEs.  
 
If the Federal Vacancies Reform Act can be amended to reduce IG attrition, the legislature 
narrative and process should be adopted at the state legislature. For the FL, IL, and NY State 
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OIG Statutes (Florida Statute 20.055, Illinois Statute Chapter 15. 305/14, New York State 
Executive Law Article 4-A), they should be amended to include the following:  
a) the need to appoint an AIG when an IG position is vacant or is anticipated to be 
vacant. Anticipated vacancy should also be clearly defined to avoid the same challenges  
b) appointed AIGs should only serve a set time period and should be monitored 
c) qualified persons to serve as AIGs should be detailed similar to FL Statute 20.055 
d) required qualifications to appoint IGs 
e) standardized procedures on removing IGs from office 
These IG vacancy amendments should increase awareness on reducing IG attrition and cause an 
increase in reported AIGs, allowing agencies to monitor AIGs’ LOS to ensure vacancies are 
short-termed.   
 
Lastly, OIGs should take initiative in measuring performance or using their performance 
analytics to determine the effectiveness of their offices. Performance analytics should include 
“live-time” data, where information is captured without breaks for audits and investigations. This 
would not only improve the office’s output but also help determine the loss of productivity when 
an IG position is vacant for extended periods. Performance analytics should start with addressing 
and resolving the IG’s TMPC. Once the major challenges are resolved, performance analytics 
should be used in important decision-making to improve overall IG performance. IGs who have 
performance data to make important decisions will have more control over agency outcomes, 















This dissertation topic started with GAO’s report Inspectors General Information on Vacancies 
and IG Community Views on Their Impact, discussing the growing concerns of federal IG 
vacancies for extended periods, leading to AIGs serving terms longer than intended, which 
reduces efficiency and effectiveness of their OIGs. This discussion has led to further review of 
federal IGs along with their IG Act, PAS/DFE IGs, and factors that may cause IG attrition. 
Conceptual explanations for IG attrition in forms of theories or case studies segued to the 
methodology chapter to measure IG attrition. This dissertation collected and analyzed federal 
and state IG attrition from 2001 – 2017, using publically available data consisting of and not 
limited to IG semi-annual reports, media reports, and labor statistics.  
 
This dissertation’s methodology started with collecting and compiling two attrition datasets – 
agency and individual. The agency dataset focused on IG attrition rates for each of the OIGs 
selected for this analysis. IGs were categorized into AIG, IG, and AIGIG for clarity and to 
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prevent duplicate reporting of records. Due to loss of data and confusions between appointment, 
confirmed, hire, and start dates, analyses in this dissertation only used the reported year of when 
these events occurred. The analyses in this dissertation also used departure year to avoid 
confusion in termination, resignation, and last reported working day in office dates. This 
dissertation methodology reported IG attrition, LOS, and wastage rates to illustrate where IG 
attrition stands at the end of the Bush and Obama administrations. Following the attrition section, 
an analysis of federal and state statutes found that existing legislature on IG attrition is unclear 
and requires amendment. Chapter 5 recommended amendments to the Federal Vacancies Reform 
Act, conversion from DFE IGs to PAS IGs, and amendments to the state legislatures to detail 
qualifications and approaches towards addressing vacant IG positions.  
 
In short, this dissertation concludes the following on IG attrition. 
1. IG attrition is a problem for federal OIGs and is recognized by the CIGIE, GAO, POGO, 
and other organizations that monitor federal IGs.  
2. AIGs serving for extended periods is a problem for federal OIGs and not state OIGs. 
3. IG attrition is not a problem for state OIGs, given their low rates of AIGs. 
4. There is limited academic research on IG attrition. Existing literature only analyzes 
federal IGs.  
5. Measuring IG attrition is challenging given the unique nature of OIGs and staff 
composition in comparison to other professions.  
6. Measuring the impact of IG attrition is challenging. An approach towards measuring IG 
attrition impacts starts with performance analytics, which is usually not implemented or 
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used in OIGs. Once an OIG uses performance analytics, they can measure output 
differences during periods of IG vacancy. 
7. Empirical theories can only partially explain the causes of IG attrition.  
8. IG LOS varies by presidential term regardless if it is federal or state jurisdiction.  
9. Federal OIG law enforcement authority has a statistical relationship with rates of federal 
AIGs.  
10. The properties of the amended IG Act, FL, IL, and NY state IG legislature barely address 
the job position requirements and attrition.  
11. Policy recommendations to reduce IG attrition are the following: 
a. Amendments to the Federal Vacancies Act, IG Act, and state IG statutes to 
properly define and address IG attrition. These amendments should clearly 
explain the roles of a Deputy IG during an IG vacancy and requirements to 
appoint an official IG within a short period. 
b. Conversion from DFE to PAS OIGs to increase IG independence. Independence 
is essential for IGs and IGs without independence are likely to resign. 
c. OIGs should use performance measurement analytics to improve effectiveness of 
their offices. Analyzing OIG performance is critical for IGs to make important 
decisions, allowing them to effectively accomplish organization goals. IGs who 
are unable to accomplish organization goals are likely to resign. 
The conclusions of this research project only addressed IG attrition from 2001 – 2017. Future 
research on IG attrition should focus on the statistical test results covered in this dissertation, 
amendments to the IG Act and state IG legislatures, IG attrition of other states not mentioned in 
this analysis, and performance measurement for IG offices with high rates of attrition. 
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Additionally, future research should focus on the statistical significant relationships in this 
dissertation, such as the events during presidential terms to explain IG attrition. A sample 
research question is “What events under the Bush or Obama administration causes IG attrition?” 
A qualitative case study on political events under different presidential administrations can 
conceptually explain IG attrition. Another research question can focus on IG legislature, and 
forecasted amendments to reduce IG attrition. Amendment examples include addressing IG job 
requirements, vacant IG positions, and processes for anticipated vacant IG positions. The federal 
IG Act and state IG statutes should ensure that it clearly defines the word “attrition” and not 
repeat the same challenges that the Federal Vacancies Reform Act is encountering now. With 
enough research on IG legislature at the state jurisdiction, it may eventually lead to new 
legislature that is applied to all state IGs similar to the IG Act.  
 
Future research on IG attrition should identify and analyze potential causal factors tied to 
political events. Causal factors for IG attrition includes budget, expenditures, fiscal health, along 
with other sociodemographic variables, similar to CAPI’s survey research on oversight 
institutions (2016). These causal factors can affect attrition as well as IG LOS. Most literature 
and reports on IG attrition only focus on federal OIGs, with little research on OIGs in other 
governmental jurisdictions. Additionally, there are no attrition measurements instruments 
designed specifically for OIGs and should be explored further to create a unique attrition formula 
just for OIGs. Future research should avoid the use of standard attrition and other similar 




Unique characteristics of OIGs such as law enforcement authority should be researched further 
to determine if they lead to IG attrition. Some examples include OIG budget, subpoena power, 
special training programs, and increased independence or jurisdiction. Future research on this 
topic should start with federal OIGs, followed by state and local OIGs. Local OIG attrition 
should also be a future research topic, and given its minimal publicity in comparison to federal 
and state OIGs, a case-by-case qualitative analysis will determine if IG attrition exists at the local 
jurisdiction. 
 
Another future research topic should be on IG performance measurement. Performance 
measurement of IGs should stray away from the use of ROI reports because it focuses on 
program outputs and not program outcomes and other instruments should be used to measure IG 
performance. The role of the OIG is to improve its efficiency and effectiveness instead of 
prioritizing the number of dollars saved. Dollars saved can be a sub-section of efficiency but not 
a complete measurement. Additionally, not all offices have performance data, nor do they have 
systems or processes to collect data. OIGs should have performance data analytics and use the 
analytics for important organization decisions. For OIGs that already have performance data 
analytics and use the data for operations, they should have “live-time” access to the information 
to streamline audits and investigations. With the use of IG performance measurement data, it can 
also conceptually explain IG attrition. 
 
Lastly, there were numerous future research topics on state IG attrition identified in this 
dissertation. The first research topic should focus on the remaining State OIGs not included in 
this analysis. This research topic should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis given the unique 
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nature of each state jurisdiction. The second research topic can focus on why some states have 
state OIGs while other states do not. This research topic can start with identifying states that do 
not have a statewide OIG but have state OIGs who informally represent as the state OIG. The 
third research topic should focus on state AIGs and why AIGs is a norm at the federal level and 
not the state level. Finally, the last future research topic introduced in this dissertation should 






















Exhibit 1a – Presidentially appointed Federal OIGs 
● Corporation for National and Community Service 
● Department of Agriculture  
● Department of Commerce  
● Department of Defense  
● Department of Education  
● Department of Energy 
● Department of Health and Human Services 
● Department of Homeland Security 
● Department of Housing and Urban Development 
● Department of the Interior  
● Department of Justice  
● Department of Labor  
● Department of State  
● Department of Transportation  
● Department of the Treasury  
● Department of Veterans Affairs 
● Environmental Protection Agency 
● Export-Import Bank 
● Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
● Federal Housing Finance Agency  
● General Services Administration 
● National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
● National Reconnaissance Office 
● National Security Agency  
● Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
● Office of Personnel Management  
● Railroad Retirement Board 
● Small Business Administration  
● Social Security Administration  
● Tennessee Valley Authority 
● Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
● U.S. Agency for International Development 
 
Exhibit 1b – Agency appointed Federal OIGs 
● Amtrak 
● Appalachian Regional Commission 
● Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection 
● Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled (Ability One 
Program) 
● Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
● Consumer Product Safety Commission 
● Corporation for Public Broadcasting  
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● Defense Intelligence Agency 
● Denali Commission 
● Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
● Farm Credit Administration 
● Federal Communications Commission 
● Federal Election Commission  
● Federal Labor Relations Authority  
● Federal Maritime Commission  
● Federal Trade Commission 
● Legal Services Corporation 
● National Archives and Records Administration 
● National Credit Union Administration  
● National Endowment for the Arts  
● National Endowment for the Humanities  
● National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  
● National Labor Relations Board 
● National Science Foundation 
● Peace Corps 
● Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
● Postal Regulatory Commission  
● Securities and Exchange Commission  
● Smithsonian Institution 
● U.S. Election Assistance Commission  
● U.S. International Trade Commission  
● U.S. Postal Service 
 
Exhibit 2 – Florida, Illinois, and New York State OIGs 
 
Florida 
● Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the Inspector General 
● Agency for Persons with Disabilities  
● Agency for Workplace Innovation 
● Board of Governors  
● Chief Inspector General 
● Citizens Property Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General  
● Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Inspector General  
● Department of Business & Professional Regulation Office of Inspector General  
● Department of Children and Families Office of Inspector General 
● Department of Citrus 
● Department of Corrections Office of Inspector General  
● Department of Economic Opportunity Office of Inspector General  
● Department of Education Office of Inspector General 
● Department of Elder Affairs Office of Inspector General 
● Department of Environmental Protection Office of Inspector General 
● Department of Financial Services 
● Department of Health Office of Inspector General 
● Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Office of Inspector General 
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● Department of Juvenile Justice Office of Inspector General   
● Department of Law Enforcement Office of Inspector General 
● Department of Lottery Office of Inspector General 
● Department of Management Services Office of Inspector General  
● Department of Revenue Office of Inspector General 
● Department of State 
● Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General  
● Department of Veterans' Affairs Office of Inspector General  
● Division of Emergency Management Office of Inspector General  
● Executive Office of Governor Rick Scott 
● Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Office of Inspector General 
● Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Office of Inspector General  
● Florida University Office of Inspector General  
● Housing Finance Corporation Office of Inspector General 
● International University  
● Office of Attorney General Office of Inspector General  
● Office of Early Learning Office of Inspector General  
● Office of Financial Regulation 
● Office of Insurance Regulation Office of Inspector General 
● Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller 
● Public Service Commission 
● State Board of Administration 
● Supreme Court of Florida Office of the Inspector General  
● Water Management District Office of Inspector General 
 
Illinois 
● Auditor General 
● Comptroller 
● Department of Children and Family Services 
● Department of Healthcare and Family Services 
● Department of Human Resources 
● General Assembly, Legislative Inspector General 
● Office of Executive Inspector General for the Agencies of the Illinois Governor 
● Office of Executive Inspector General for the Illinois State Treasurer 
● Office of the Inspector General for the Attorney General 
● Secretary of State Office of Inspector General 
● State Toll Highway Authority Office of the Inspector General 
 
New York State 
● Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Office of Special Investigations 
● Dormitory Authority Office of Internal Affairs 
● MTA Office of Inspector General 
● NY State Unified Court System Office of Inspector General 
● Office of Medicaid Inspector General 
● Office of Welfare Office of Inspector General 
● State Comptroller 
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● State Inspector General 
● Workers Compensation Office of Inspector General 
 
Exhibit 3 – State OIGs in the United States (2017)  
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